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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
~JA)IES LATSES AND 
,T ... £\.MES SDR.ALES, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
NICK FLOOR, INC., 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Appeal From the Third District Court of Utah, 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This appeal involves a controversy between 
the plaintiffs., the appellants, and Nick Floor, Inc., 
the defendant and respondent, as to the possession 
of a certain storeroom - the first-floor ~and base-
ment at 79 ·West Second South street, being1 the 
northwest corner of what is known as the Eagle 
building or block situate at the southeast corner of 
Second South and West Temple streets, Salt Lake 
City. With respect thereto, the plaintiffs claim 
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2 
title and possession of the premises through war-
ranty deeds from the the:ru owners of the Eagle Block 
executed May 31, 1939, including the premises in 
question. . The defendant .claims possession of the 
storeroom and basement by virtue of a ce~rtain lease 
executed and delivered to it by the then owners, of 
the Eagle Block on September 2fj, 193-3, .for a period 
1of three years, with an option on conditions stated 
in the lease for an additional period of five years, 
or to and including September 25, 1941, the said 
lease being exe·cuted and delivered by an admitted 
agent of the then owners of the block. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR 
ALLE,GED CAUSE. 
By the complaint of the plaintiffs it was al-
leged, (A b. 1), that on or about September 25, 1933, 
the then owners of the Eagle block leased and de-
mised the premises in question to the defendant 
''from month to month at a monthly rental of $70.00 
payable monthly in advance, and that on or about the 
1st day of May, 1935, by mutual agreement,. the rental 
was fixed at $90.00 per month; and tha.t by virtue 
of such lease the defendant went into possesRion o-t 
the said premises and still continues to hold and 
occupy the same;" that on May 31, 1939, the prem-
ises by warranty deed _were conveyed to the plain-
tiffs by the owners of the Eagle Block, who then 
became and ever sjnce have been the owners there-
'6f, and that on Ju~e 2, 1939, the plaintiffs in writing 
demanded possession of the premises on or before 
July 1, 1939, which the defendant refused to sur-
render; hence this _ action for restitution and 
damages. 
The defendant demurred generally and spe-
cially to the complaint, which \vas overruled, and 
the:n answered, denyjng the lease and the terms a.nd 
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.. .., 
t) 
conditions thereof as alleged in the complaint, o-r 
that anv lea~e \Yas n1ade from month to month 01 
.. . 
that defendant 'vent into possession of or occupied 
the premises in Yirtue or in pursuance of any such 
lease, as alleged in the complaint; and averred that 
a \Yritten lease \Yas entered into September 25, 1933, 
by the terms of \Vhich the p:remises in question were 
derni8ed and leased to the defendant for a period of 
three years at an agreed rental of $75.00 per month, 
and \Yith the further stipulation stated in the leas-e 
that for and in consideration of the defendant mak-
ing permanent improvements in and upon the 
premises to the amount of $1,000.00 on or before 
Ivtay 1, 1935, the defendant \vas given possession of 
the premises for an additional period of five years 
from September 25, 1936, at a rental of $90.00 p-er 
Inonth for and during such additional five years; 
tl1at the defendant, prior to May 1, 1935, made such 
permanent improvements to the value in excess of 
$1,000.00, and since S-eptember 25, 1936, paid to the 
owners of the building the rental of $90.00 a month 
and aR in the lease stipulated; and that under and 
in pursuance of such lease and not otherwise, the 
defendant entered into and c.ontinued in possession 
of the premises; a cop~y of the lease, (A b. 11), was' 
attached to the answer and made a part thereof. 
To that the plaintiffs replied, (Ab. 15) that 
the lease attached to the defendant's ans,ver was 
void under Section 33-5-1 and 33-5-2, R. S. 1933, 
because not executed by the- owners:) the predeces-
~ors of the plaintiffs, or by anyone in Wliting 
•tu thorized so to do; and further alleged that the 
defendant had not expended the sum of $1,000.00, or 
nnv sum, in permanent improvements and had not 
at ·anv time exercised the pretended option referred 
to in. the lease. The defendant th~n further an-
Awered. ( .... L\.h. 16), pl~ading an estoppel, consisting 
of about four pages of the printed a.bstra.ct, to which! 
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4 
reference is hereby ma.de, to which pleaded estoppel 
the plaintiffs filed a general denial. 
Upon these issues the case ·came on for trial be-
fore the court without a jury. The court made spe_ 
cific and complete findings on all of the issues in 
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, 
(Ab. 2.2-37). We refer to the findings in the main 
as a complete answer to the appellant's brief where-
in the findings are given but scant consideration. 
True, assignments are made with respect to most 
of them. But see (App,ellants' brief, 44) how feeble 
consideration is given them as to insufficiency of 
tvidence to support them, or as pointing out par .. 
ticulars \vherein it is~ claimed the evidence is in-
sufficient. 
The ap:pellants, however, say the court erred 
in finding No. 1, "that on September 25, 1933, the 
Stockyards National Bank of South Omaha, W. P. 
Noble Company and the Bragg Estate by and 
through their agent, A. H. Ball,'' leased and de-
mised the premises in question to the defendant. 
The lease attached to the defendant's answer was 
so executed. It so states. Let the Court look at 
it. (Ab. 11-14). There is no dispute as to that. It 
'\vas the only lease put in evidence. It was the 
·only ·lease under which the evidence showed the de-
fendant took and continued in possession and was 
in\ possession when notice- was served on it to 
vacate the leased premises. As. to that, the plain-
tiffs replied, not that the lease was not executed by 
1an agent, as in the findings stated, but that the lease 
'vas void .- that it 'vas nothing, - because A. H. 
Ball, the admitted agent of the grantors of the 
plaintiffs, had no authority in writing to execute it. 
~,he defendant denied that, and by its additional 
ans'\\rer for reasons therein stated. pleaded an es-
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top·pel as to both the gr~tors of the plaintiffs and 
a~ to the plaintiffs themselves, which estoppel by 
their further reply 'Yas denied by the plaintiffs. 
In this connection some stagger of complaint 
i:; also made as to findings Nos. 2 and 3. Let them 
be read in the abstract. No con1plaint is made that 
the court by such findings did not properly reflect 
the essentials of the plaintiffs' complaint, or of any 
of the pleadings as hereinbefore noted, or that the 
lease as alleged in the complaint was not personally 
entered into by and between the predecessors of 
the plaintiffs and the defendant, or that the court 
incorrectly stated, that by the complaint of the 
plaintiffs it was averred that the. defendant ''by 
virtue of such lease (as alleged in the complaint) 
went into possession of the said premises and still 
continues to hold and occupy the same." As is seen, 
the court specifically found that no evidence was 
ndduced to show the existence or the making of anj 
~uc h lease
4 
as so alleged in the plaintiffs' compl8int; 
that the allegations of such a lease were wholly un-
supported by any evidence. But the appellants 
complain of such :fin din:~. N owhe~re do they point 
r·nt- any evidence adduced by them in sup·port of such 
a lease. As to the kind of lease alleged in the plain-
tiffs' complaint the record is barren of any evidence. 
Whether the plaintiffs may wholly abandon the kind 
,.__,~ l0'1t"~ so alleged by them and rely for recovery 
upon the lease alleged by the defendant, will pres-
Pntlv be noted. The point now being considered is 
that the complaints made by the appellants that 
fin din~ No. 2 "\Vi th re·spect to the pleadings and find .. 
ing No. 3 with respect to the want of evidence to 
snnport the lease alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, 
.a.re ,\ ... holly groundless: and no evidence -not any~ 
thing- is pointed to by the, appellants to support 
their contention thn.t such findings are not sup-
ported. What conclusion is to be deduced from 
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such findi~g.s is another matter and will p~resently 
be considered . 
Let it first be noted what the facts are, and as 
found by the court in such particular. Counsel's 
argument on conclusions based on groundless chal-
lenges of such £indings does not get them any-
where. Counsel do not consider the case upon find-
ing's 2 or 3 as made by the court. They, in effect, 
now say that no reliance is placed upon the lease 
as alleged in the complaint of pJaintiffs, and no 
claim now made that the de!endant, as alleged by 
the plaintiffs, 'vent into possession or occupied the 
premises, ''in virtue of such lease,'' as in the com-
plaint alleged. They now in effect proceed on the 
theory a.s an abandonment of the le~se p}eaded hy 
them, and now claim that the defendant went into 
possession and occupied the premises for a period 
of nearly six years in virtue of the lease pleaded by 
, tl~(· defendant but which the plaintiffs averred was 
absolutely void, notwithstanding the pleaded and 
found part performance and estoppel. 
In this connection, let us now look at the con-
clusions of la"7 with respect to findings 2 and 3. 
By conclusion of la·w· No. 1 (Ab. 37), the court 
stated that the plaintiffs, to recover, were required 
to do so upon the case tnade by their eornplaint, and 
not upon one which may have been developed by 
proof, and as no suc}l ~ase as alleged by the plain-
tiffs was established by evidence, and as no judg-
ment could be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs 
except on proof e~tablishing the cause of action as 
:1.lleged by the plaintiffs in their complaint, it fol-
]o,ved, that the eomplaint a.gainf?t the defendant had 
to be dismissed for want of ev~ence to sust,ain the 
cause of action as alleged in th~ complaint. 
Bv conclusion No. 2. (Ab. 37), th~ court further 
·stated. that the plaintiffs were not entitled to sup-
port their eause of action by recourse to the alleged 
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lease in the defendant's ansvver and the evide·nce 
adduced by the defendant in support thereof, for 
that the plaintiffs by their verified replies to the 
defendant's ans,ver denied the existence, validity 
and binding effect of the lease as s.o alleged 
in the defendant's answer, declared that such 
leas.e under the statute of frauds was abso-
lutely void, and that in such case the court stated 
a plaintiff could not aid his cause by recourse to 
material allegations of his adversary, which, as 
here, by replies, \vere specifically denied and by evi-
dence of the plain tiffs controverted. 
It is thus seen that no evidence whatever was 
given to sustain the lease as alleged in the complaint 
of plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs, having denied the 
alleged lease pleaded in the answer of the defend-
ant and by evidence controverted its existence, can-
not now as an aider to their cause of action avail 
themselves of the allegations , in such respect -con-
tained in the answer, nor the evidence· given with 
respect thereto, and particularly may not now 
accept a part and reject a part thereof, or seek to 
avail themselves of \vhat 'in such particular they 
deem suitable and repudiate and reject or hold 
for naught what may be deemed unfavorable to 
them. 
It, of course, is familiar doctrine that a mere 
imperfect or defectiv~ complaint or pleading often 
is and may be aided by a pleading of the adversary. 
1 Bancroft Code Pll., Sec. 737, p. 1035. 
Robbins v. Duggins, 61 Utah 542; 216 Pa.c. 
232. 
But just as well is it established that a plaintiff 
may not rely upon a pleading of his advers,ary 
where he has denied in his reply the alle~g1ation.s 
\Vhich he later relies on for assistance. 
1 Bancroft Code Pl.j Sec. 738, p. 1038. 
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Worley v. Peterson, (Utah) ; 12 Pac. (2d) 
579, on rehearing p. 587. 
Mantle v. White, 47 ~font. 234; 132 Pac. 22. 
Greenberg v. German-American Ins. Co., 
83 Ore. 660; 160 Pac. 536. 
Just as vte~ll is it established and it is jus,t as 
fundamental that a. plaintiff must recover, if at all, 
upon the cas.e made by his complaint, and not upon 
a case which may be develop.ed by proof; and that 
a judgment cannot be sustained, unless the proof 
establishes the cause of action alleged in the com-
plaint, even though a different cause of action may 
be fully proved. 
1 Bancroft Code Pl., 984, 
_and numerous cases there cited in support thereof. 
Such holding is. in line ,vith th(:\ well established and 
familiar rule or maxim, allegatta et probata; alle ... 
gations and proof must correspond. This Court in 
numerous cases has frequently so applied the rule. 
Nor can the plaintiffs help themselves by 
claiming a mere variance, for that the clairn or 
cause of action alleged in the comp1aint is un-
supported by any evidence, not in some me-re par-
ticular· or particulars, but unsupported in its gen-· 
era.l scope and meani~g, and hence, the case may 
not be deemed a variance, but a failure of proof. 
R. S. 1933, Sec. 104-14-2. 
'I' his is particularly true,· for that the lease alleged 
jn the defendant's answer is adverse to any kind of 
a lease alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. As 
heretofore stafed, the only evidence as to the mak-
ing of any lease is that contained in the defendant's 
answer. But the plaintiffs say such leasH is abso-
lutely void and is for naught. There being no evi-
dence to sustain any other lease in fact, or one as 
in the complaint alleged, it follows that the plain-
tiffs' alleged cause of action stands unsupported hy 
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evidence, and hence, is 'vholly insufficient to sup-
port any kind of judgment on the c.ause of action 
as in the complaint alleged. 
,,~ e kno"" counsel in their brief in effect aban-
Jon their complaint and the lease as therein al-
leged, p~oint to no evidence which supports that 
kind of a lease, no longer claim that the defendant 
went into possession of the leased premises as al-
leged by then1 in virt.ue of the lease as stated in 
the complaint, but now assert that the defendant 
\Yent and for six years continued in possession un-
der the lease pleaded by it in its ans,ver, which 
lease the plaintiffs no"\v assert was absolutely void, 
because by its terms being a- lease for more ~han 
one year and it not being shown that A. H. Ball, the 
admitted a.g1ent of the predecessors and grantors. 
of the plaintiffs, who had exclusive charge and 
management of the premises and who as such agent 
111ade the lease in the name of and for the use and 
benefit of such predecessors, had authority ~in 
writing to make such a lease, and therefore it was 
absolutely void, and thus the plaintiffs as they 
assume could not change their position and ass.ert 
that the defendant, instead of entering into the pos-
session of the premises in virtue of the lease· set 
forth in the complaint, did so in virtue of the lease 
set forth in the defendant's answer, which now as 
they assert gives the plaintiffs as the grantee of 
such nredccessor~J the right in law to treat and 
regard the possession of the defendant as a mere 
tenant from month to month, which tenancy by giv-
ing- notice, could be terminated at any time and. the 
defendant dispossessed of the premises, regardless 
of nart performance by the defendant or of ben-
efits received by the predecessors. of the plaintiffs 
l""" PVPn by the plaintiffs themselves. 
"Whatever merit there may be to such a .conten-
Hon, \vhich presently ,vill be considered~ still, no 
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such cause of action or one on any such a theory is 
pleaded in the complaint of the p~laintiffs. As has 
been s.een, what is alleged by the p~laintiffs in their 
complaint is that their predecessors and grantors 
made and entered into a lease with the defendant, 
1easing and demisin;g the premises to it from month 
to month at $70.00 a month and nearly two years 
thereafter "by mutual agreement" between the 
parties, the rental was increased to ·$90.00, and ''by 
virtue of such a lease, (not by virtue of any other 
lease), the defendant went into possession of the 
'P'remises and still continues to hold and occupy the 
same,'' until the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint 
iu this action, on or about August 2·2, 1939, a period 
of nearly six years. It is difficult to conceive two 
theories more inconsistent 'vith each other than the 
one alleged in the comyJaint and the one in the de-
fendant's ans,ver and denied by the plaintiffs by 
their reply, and who now in effect seek assistance 
by "\Vhat was solemnly denied by them. No such 
Jiberality in pleadings - to permit one to recover 
on 'vhat is denied by him - may be indulged by the 
most optimistic reformer without casting to the 
wind the very basic and fundamental p~rinciples of 
y,leadings .and to ignore the use and purpose of 
t.hem . 
. And further, it indisputably was shown that 
the plaintiffs, prior to their purchase of the Eagle 
Block, including the premis.es in question, had not 
only constructive notice, but had actual knowledge, 
of the defendant's lease and knew that the defend-
• ant was in possession in pursuance thereof, had 
different .conversations ,vith the defendant con-
rerning it, had examined a copy of the lease with 
their counsel, knew and were told that the term 
period of the lease had not expired until September, 
1 n4J. (A b. 97, 108; Tr. 313, 379, 381), and of course, 
having examined the lPase, the plaintiffs knew of 
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the provision of the lease, (A b. 14), that for and in 
consideration of the expenditure by the defendant, 
on or before lvlay 1, 19J3, in making permanent im-
provements to the extent of $1,000.00 in and upon 
the s.tore and basement leased to the defendant a 
term p·eriod of the lease was granted for an addi-
tional five years from September 25, 1936, or to 
September 25, 1941, and upon the payment of 
monthly rentals by the defendant of $90.00 for such 
additional five-year period. 
Confessedly, and as hereinbefore stated, no 
evidenee was ,given to support the aveTment in_ the 
complaint of plaintiffs that on or ahout May 1, 1935 
"by mutual agreement" or Ly any agree1nent then 
made, "the rental was fixed at ·$90.00 a month." 
Whatever arrangement there \Vas between the par-
ties as to an increase of rental to $90.00 a month 
·wa.s as stated in the written lease attached to the 
defendant's answer, that in consideration of the de-
fendant making the pern1anent improven1ents to the 
extent of ·$1,000.00 and paying the increased rental 
of $90.00 a month, a period of the lea8e was granted 
for an additional five years. All that vvas part and 
parcel of the· lease itself entered into and granted 
September 25, 1933. Further than that, there was 
110 evidence of any such increased monthly rental. 
For various and quite apparent reasons, the pla!n-
liffs in drawing their complaint, did not d~sire· to 
reflect th~ true status of such increased rental or 
the consideration or condition upon \vhich such 
monthly rental 'vas to h0 increased, and as stated in 
the defendant's lease. · So the matter was smoke-" 
~creened by an averment in the complaint of plain-
tiffs that on May 1, 1935, there V\ras an independent 
''mutual agreement'' entered into by and between 
the parties fixing the monthly rental at. $90.00, when 
in truth and in fact, there was no such separate and 
·independent agreement, and no evidence "\vhatever 
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:to support s.uch an averment as alle;ged by the 
plaintiffs. 
If, therefore, p~aragraphs 2 and 3 of the court's 
findings are supported by the record, (and not any-
thing pointe·d out wherein they are not so sup-
ported), and if p·aragrap~hs 1 and 2 of the court's 
conclusions of law are under the law as heretofore 
·stated, correctly drawn and stated, then the judg-
ment of the court below must be affirmed, reg~rd­
less of any and all other questions presented by the 
appellants. 
PLAINTIFF'S POINTS 
There are some 42 assignments. Fourteen of 
them relate to the fi~dings and conclusions. Under 
1assign.m.ents 10 to 21, inclusive, are grouped about 
42 exhibits of the defendant admitted in evidence . 
. Assignment 10 is a fair samp~le. It is rather a. large 
load in one shotgun. Looks like shrapnel. Twenty-
three of the assignments relate to examination and 
cross examination of witnesses. Not anything is 
exhibited in the abstract or even in the plaintiff8.' 
.briefs to show irrelevancy or immateriality or any 
abuse of dis.cretion with resp~ect to such alleged 
complaints. Nor is there anything exhibited in the 
abstract or in the brief of counsel showing even the 
substance or contents of the various exhibits put 
]n evidence with the excep1tion of one or two. What 
references are made with resp·ect to them are mere-
ly by numbers. To ascertain any idea of their con-
tents requires resort to the transcript to which the 
exhibits are attached, quite a bunch to find what 
i~ desired. They relate to the making of written 
1flase~, the manner in which the agents of the own-
ers of the premises and prede-cessors of the plain-
tiffs conducted the business., the reports· made by 
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their agents from tin1e to t.in1e concerning the col-
lection of rents, leasing of premises, payment of 
taxes, borro\ving n1oney, n1aking repairs and other 
1natter~ pertaining to the business ~arried on and 
handled by the agents of such predecessors. 
A reading of the transcript shows that counsel 
for the plaintiffs objected to about everything 
att<-•nlpted to be shown by the defendant. They ob-
jected to the cross exan1ination of their witnesses 
and to the direct examination of the defendant's 
witnesses; objected to putting in evidence the writ-
ten lease made for and on behalf of the plaintiffs' 
predecessors and attached. to the· defendant's an-· 
swer, the manner in which the busines.s was carried 
on by the admitted agentR of the plaintiffs' pre-
decessors, the leasing of the premises., the collec-
tion of rentals and making monthly reports there-
of, making repairs, and paying taxes, etc. 'rhey 
even objected to putting in evidence the lease, Ex-
hibit 28, attached to the defendant's answer. .LL\8 
heretofore shown, no evidence \Vas gi,.,.Pn on behalf 
of the plaintiffs as to their alleged lease or as to 
any lease, oral or written, between the parties. 
Still they objected to proving or admitting in evi-
dence the lease attached to the defendant's answer. 
Had they been successful in keeping it out, there 
'vould have be·en no evidence whatever as to any 
kind of a tenancy existing between the p~a.rties and 
not anythjng to Rhovv the circumstances or condi-
tions under which the defendant was or had been 
~ n possession of the premises for nearly six years, 
in which cas.e the plaintiffs would have been left 
wandering in the woods and lost as to how they got 
in or how to get out. In other words, the plaintiffs 
~oug-ht to have the court declare the lease attached 
to the defendant's ansvver for naught and void, re-
gardless of giving the defendant an opportunity to 
shovv the circumstances and conditions under which 
the l~a~c wras made-, part performance by the de-
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fendant, benefits received by the predecessors of 
the plaintiffs, actual knowledge of the plaintiffs, of 
the defenda.nt's lease before they p·urchas.ed the 
premises and of the circumstances of the defend-
ant's poss.ession and the making of permanent im-
provements by it in pursuance of and reliance upon 
the lease. 
Thus, the appellants by their brief note: (1) 
that A. II. Ball, the admitted agent of the prede-ces-
sors of the plaintiffs., was not authorized in writing 
to e·xecute the lease for and on behalf of the owners 
of the premises; (2} that the lease was void because 
not executed on behalf of all the owners; (3) that 
the defendant had not acted in good faith; ( 4) that 
there was no evidence to show an estoppel, etc.; 
(5} that no notic~ was. given to the owners them-
selves of any extension of the lease from three to 
five additional years, or that the owners in writing 
had consented thereto, and no evidence to show 
that the defendant had expended $1,000.00 in per-
manent imp·rovements.; (6) that the plaintiffs were 
not liable for attorney's fees ; and ( 7) that most of 
the findings and conclusions of law were erroneous 
\vithout sufficiently specifying the particulars 
thereof. No direct reference in counsel's brief is 
tnade or any discussion had in respect of the 
numerous. assignments made relating to the exam-
ination of witnesses or to the various exhibits ad-
tni tted in evidence. As to that, they say, they de-
sire their dis.cussion on other matters to he con-
sidered. When the issues presented by the plead-
ings and the specific and complete findings made 
as to all material issues are first considered, ·as they 
should be, and when then appellants' brief is .con-
sidered, this Court cannot fail to s.ee how scantily 
the findings a.re regarded, and in many particulars 
disregarded by their brief. "'What reference they 
m9ke to evidence, they pojnt chieflv to testimony 
by- some of their witnesses. But this is a la'v case, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
and "There findings are ma.de as to p·articular issues,_ 
the evidence and the reasonable inferences deducible 
therefron1 and from the p·roven facts and circum..~ 
stances in support thereof, 'vill be accepted rather 
than testimony on behalf of the appellants in con-
flict therewith. 
As abstract propositions, we do not dispute 
that a tenant \Yithout authority in writing may not, 
\vithout the kno\\Tledge or consent of hi8 principal 
bind him as to the gTanting or conveyance of real 
estate or any interest therein of his principal, or 
to the granting of a leasehold interest therein for a 
period longer than one year, particularly where .the 
agreement or contract is still executory. 
Nor do we disp~ute the proposition that a co-
tenant cannot make a valid lease of premises aS} 
against other co-tenants so as to give the lessee a 
right to the exclusive possession of any p~art of the 
land demi8ed, unless he was authorized_ to act as 
their agent in making the lease and unless ratified 
by them. 
As well, however, is it settled that where a lea.s.e 
for more than one year is made by an agent in 
charge of premises and having complete manage-
ment thereof for his principal or principa!s, though 
the agent is not authorized in writing to. make such 
a lease, yet, where the parties had knowledge of the 
making of it by his or their agent; accepted and re-
ceived the benefits thereof and part perforn1ance on 
the part of the lessee by making permane·nt im-
provements on the demised premises, or otherwisP 
earried out the terms and conditions of the lease 
on his p~art to be performed and the payment of 
rentals as by the lease stip.ulated, or where 
other\vise to permit the principal, or princip~als, 
to invoke the statute of frauds would h~ave 
in effect worked a fraud upon the lessee, 
the principal, or principals, will be held estopped 
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to deny that his or their agent was not authorized 
in w:riting to make the lease, or to declare the lease 
veid or for naught. That is this case. Tha.t is what 
the court found and determined. That, we say, is 
not only supported by sufficient evidence, hut by 
the great weight of the evidence. 
Let us first get a. p•roper background for all 
this. Prior to September, 1933, when the lease was 
made to the defendant, the owners of the Eagle 
Block .consisted of ·w. P. Noble Comp·any, a co:r-
:poration organized under the laws of Utah~ owning 
a one-half interest in the Eagle Block, the Fred 
Bragg Estate owning a one-fourth, and the Stock-
yards National Bank of South Omaha, a one-fourth. 
Robert Gould-Smith, the secretary and treasurer 
of the Noble Company, resided in San Francisco. 
Miss Noble was president of the comp·any, residing 
in Salt Lake City; but Smith as such secretary and 
treasurer transacted substantially all the business 
of the company with respect to the block, first 
through H. T. Ball, the admitted agent of such own-
Prs, and thereafter ·A. H. Ball, their agent, with 
respect to leasing the premises, collecting rents,. 
making rep,airs, and gene·rally looking after the in-
terest of the owners in respect of the Eagie build-
ing. Smith, the active representa,tive of the Noble 
Company, then and prior thereto resided in San 
Francisco, California. All the heirs and those in-
terested in the ],red Bragg Estate resided in Wyo-
ming and their business with respect to the E>agle 
huilding was handled for them by their attorney C.L. 
Brome at Basin, Wyoming; and those interes,ted in 
the Stockyards Bank at South Omaha, resided in 
O)naha, all non-residents of Utah. It is not clear 
on the record just when the bank acquired its in-
terest. Som.e refe-rence is made that they at one 
time held a mortgage lien on the buildin!r which 
was foreclosed; but just when that '\va.s, is ·~ot def-
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1; 
initely shown. Ho,vever: it is clear that the bank 
at its foreclosure p-roceedings or other,vise acquired 
it~ iuterest some tiine prior to ·l~)32. See defend-
ant's bxhibit No. 1. 
~'he defendant's lease is dated September 25, 
1933, but in fact was not signed until October, 1933 
{ Tr. 253) or November, 1933, after A. H. Ball re-
turned fron1 Chicago (A b. 82-83), and then was by 
him sig~1ed as agent for the Stockyards National 
Bank of South Omaha, the W. P. Noble Company 
and the Fred Bragg· Estate. Some time prior to 
lviay 15, 1935, the exa.ct time again is not stated, the 
Stockyards National Bank conveyed its one-fourth 
interest to ·William H. Dressler and Fred E. Ho¥ey, 
as trustees for liquidation. (A b. 65). B'ut, as the 
record shows, such interest thereafter, as before, 
\vas treated and referred to by the parties as still the 
interest of the Stockyards National Bank. On May 
27, 1939, the Noble Company conveyed its one-half 
interest by warranty deed to the plaintiffs; the 
heirs of the Bragg Estate on May 13, 1939 conveyed 
their one-fourth interest to the plaintiffs, and on 
May 12, 1939. William H. Dressler a.nd Fred E. 
Hovey, .as trustees, conveyed their interest as such, 
to the plaintiffs. Until then all reports of husiness 
affairs and transactions concerning the E·agle Block 
and remittances of collections of rent were made, 
one-half to the Noble Company, one-fourth to the' 
Fred Bragg Estate and one-fourth to the Stock-
vards National Bank or to the bank in care of Wil .. 
iiam H. Dressler; and in such manner without ob-
jections such reports and remittances were so re-
ceived and acknowledged. 
For many years and until his death, which 
occurred a few days prior to Sep~temher 2·5, 1933} 
W. T. Gunter, an attorney at Salt Lake City, and 
as their counsel, represented all of the owners of 
the Eagle building and advised them as to their 
several interests in the building and handled t.he,ir 
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legal matters with respect thereto (A b. 80). For 17 
years and until his death in June, 1930, H. T 0 Ball, 
residing in Salt Lake City, was employed by all of 
the owners as their ag:ent in managing, h~dling 
and caring for the block or building, to procure 
tenants therefor, to demise, .lease and let various 
parts· thereof to different tenants, collect the rent-
als of premises so leased by him, pay the taxes on 
the building, make and keep it in repair, keep the 
premises insured, and remit the rentals each month 
to the respective owners, and in the performance 
of s~uch duties he entered into written leases, some 
of them for three years) ·prepared by Attorney 
O·unter for and on behalf of the owners and pre-
decessors of the plaintiffs and were signed by H. T. 
Ball, as agent for and on their behalf. See Exhibits 
27, 26 and 2'5 in the transcript. 
H. T. Ball died in June, 1930. For a yea.r and 
a half prior to his death and while he was sick, his 
son, A. H. Ball, assisted him in collecting the rents 
and helped in looking after the prop~erty, and con-
r;ulted Gunter with respect thereto. The son thns 
became familial.. vvith the work theretofore per-
formed by his father (.£ott b. 68) .. That his father had 
signed written leases p.repared by Gunter for and 
on behalf of the p~redecessors of the plaintiffs for 
a period of more than one year. was clearly shown 
by the evidence. At his father 'R death, his son, A. H. 
Ball, bec:ame the agent of the ov1ners and predeces-
sors of the plaintiffs., at which time there were at 
least s.even leases in writing executed by his father 
and given to various tenants in possession, (A b. 69; 
Tr.178), all of which were p~rep:ared by ~unter for 
H. T. Ball to sigtn and 'vhich he did· sign for and on 
behalf of the o~rners and pTedecessors of the p~lain­
tiffs. ·When H. T. Ball died, Gunter told A. H. 
Ball to look after the business a.s his father had. and 
to collect the rents and put them in a bank and ~ake 
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OUt StateiUents Of rentHl8 \\Thich Were O~l( 'd by 
Gunter and sent to the resp.ective owners, W. P. 
Koble C\nnpa.ny, to Charles R. Brome for the Bragg 
~state, and to the Stockyards National Bank of 
South Omaha. That \Yas in June, 1930. Smith 
attended the funeral of H. T. Ball. He told the son 
to look after the business as his father had done. 
A few days thereafter he wrote a letter from San 
Francisco to Gunter to that effect. The letter ad-
vi~ed Gunter that as A. H. Ball knew all about the 
property, he ad\ised it would be logical to have him 
handle the work the same as his father had done. 
Gunter at that tirne also wrote letters to the Stock-
yards National Bank and to the attorney represent-
ing the Bragg Estate-, both of whom in reply also 
stated to let the son handle the business the same 
as hi_s father had. (~~b. 72, :·3; Tr. 184, 185, 186). 
They were written and replies received shortly 
after the death of H. T. Ball. They, with many 
other letters, writings and documents from the pre-
decessors of the plaintiffs concerning; transactions 
had between them and Gunter, came into his hands 
and were kept by him. When Gunter died Septem-
b8r 23~ 1933, his folks shortly the-reafter left Utah 
and much of such and similar matters were de ... 
stroyerl hy th2m, thinkjn~ they no longer were of 
a.ny consequence (Ab. 77). However, the letters 
written hy Gunter and the replies thereto concerning 
the emp1oyment of li. H. Ball 'vere by Gunter shown 
to Ball who testified from memory as to their con-
tPnt~. As to some (Yf them, he '\vas corroborated by 
testimony or his wife. 
Thus A. H. Ball, as the agent for all the owners, 
took charge of the Eagle building and managed and 
handled the business just as his father had done. 
There is no substantial dispute as to that. Some of 
those who came to Ball to rent premises in the 
building, desired written leases. He ga:ve such 
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leases just as his father had. Gunter, until his 
death, prepared the leases to be signed by A. H. 
Ball, as the .agent of the owners of the building, just 
as he had done when H. T. Ball was the agent (Ab. 
73-75). In May, 1932 such a lease (See defendant's 
Ex. 1), was prepared by Gunter to be and which was 
signed by A. H. Ball, as the agent of the Stockyards 
National Bank of South Omaha, the W. P. Noble 
Company and the Bragg Estate, demising and 
leasing the identical property, 79 West Second South 
street, to others for a period of three years, which 
premises were later leas~d to the defendant. From 
June, 1930, after his father's death and until the 
premises were sold to the plaintiffs in May, 1939, 
.:\. H. Ball managed and handled the p·rop~_rty just 
as his father had, gave written leas.es~ first pre-
pared by Gunter and later by Cluff, collected the 
rentals, looked after the repairs of the building, 
paid the taxes, kept the premises in repair and 
\vhen necessary borrowed money at the bank to pay 
taxes and make repairs, sent one-half of the rent-
als to Smith at San F~ancisco for the Noble Com-
pany, one-fourth to C. L. Brome in Wyoming for 
the Bragg Estate, and one-fourth to the Stockyards 
~iational Bank at Omaha or to the bank in care of 
W. L. Dressler, sent monthly statements and !~:­
ports to each concerning the business handled by 
him and had numerous correspondence with them 
cnncerning the same, some of which were put in 
evidence. But here again, let it be noted that let-
ters, writings and documents received by him from 
the respective owners concerning the business 
l1andled by him were kept at his. residence, which in 
1934 or 1935 was partly destroyed bv fire and with 
it many p·ersonal effects, including letters, writings 
and documents and correspondence between him 
Hnd the several owners. 
We now come to the employment of Mr. Cluff, 
an attorney at Salt Lake City. Counsel in their 
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brief sny (page 30) that A. H. Ball, after Gunter's 
death, ''hired Cluff as attorney for his principals.'' 
They then say '' B.all at every stag1e rendered such 
help as he could to the defendant (Nick Floor, Inc.~), 
and the attorney he claims to have hired for his 
principals is in the employ of the defendant in this 
action.'' The fact is, Attorney Cluff wa.s not hired 
by Ball, but by the owners of the premises, and 
predecessors of the plaintiffs. At page 195 of the 
transcript, A. H. Ball in giving his, testimony, was 
asked: 
'' Q. Had you received directions from 
anybody about \Vho to consult after Mr. 
Gunter's death~ 
A. I wrote letters and explained tha~t I 
had had business with Mr. Cluff and he 
was a very good lawyer, and I s.uggested 
him to take and rep!reRent me, the s.ame as 
Gunter had, (who without any substantial 
di~pute was in the employ of and repre-
sented the predecessors of the plaintiffs), 
and they said it was all right. 
Q. ·Who said it was all right~ 
A. ~fr. Brome of the Bragg Estate, the _ 
Stockyards National Bank and Mr. Smith." 
On pages 224-225 on cross examination, after testi-
(ying· that he had advised with Smith concerning 
things in connection with the building1 whenever 
occasion arose, then was asked: 
"Q. And you also consulted 'vith Mr. 
Gunter about it during his lifetime~ 
A. All the time. 
Q. Yes. Now you say that you wrote to 
~fr. Gould-Smith concerning the employ-
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.ment of Cluff as~ your attorney in your 
capacity of agent, as agent of the building~ 
A. I did,'' 
~.nd when asked how soon he did that after Gun-
ter's death, he said it may be a week or two, but 
that it was prior to the making of the lease with 
the defendant, and then was asked: 
"Q. So that you didn't write 1\tir. Gould .. 
Smith about the employment of Mr. Cluff 
prior to the execution of this le.ase ( tfie 
lease to the defendant)~ 
A. I wrote him as soon as Mr. Gunter had 
passed away, and he was handling all the 
things, and I went up and I talked to Cluff. 
(As heretofore shown, the lease was not sigmed or 
entered into until in October or November, 1933, 
and was da.ted back to Sep~temher 25, 1933). He then 
further was a.sked and answered that some of the 
writings and documents were destroyed by fire and 
·some were not. 
On page 21 of the appellants.' brief, they say 
that, ''Nick Floor (the manager of the defendant, 
Nick Floor, In.c., and who transacted all'the busi-
ness for and on its behalf), testified that at the 
time he secured the lease (the lease here in ques-
tion, defendant's Ex. · 28), he consulted with and 
submitted it to an attorney, Mr. Knowlton,'' and 
referred to Abs,tract 106-107. There, the abstract 
shows that Nick Floor not only consulted Attorney 
l{nowlton, but as tes,tified to by him, he "had an 
attorney when we fixed the lease. I showed the 
lease (Ex. 28) to my attorney. _My q..ttorney was 
Horace Knowlton.'' (See also transcrip~t p~age 371). 
There it also shows that when the lease was 'fixed 
up in October or November, 1933, and dated back, 
Cluff prepared the lease and that the terms thereof 
'vere talked over by Kno,vlton as thr defendant's 
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attorney, and "~ith Cluff and Ball, representing the 
le~sor8 . .:-\_nd here let it again be· noted that H. T. 
Ball, until his death, and A. H. Ball thereafter con-
sulted \Yith and \Yas advised by Gunter until his 
death concerning the management and hruJdling of 
the property and the making of leases, as well as, to 
all other leg~al matters and business affairs relating 
to the property. Cpon the great weight of the evi-
dence, no claim may be made, that Gunter was not 
in the employ of a.nd did not represent the owners 
of the prop·erty and the predecessors of the plain-
tiffs as their attorney. At least there \va.s ample 
sufficient evidence, if not by a clear and manifest 
\Yeight of the evidence, to sho_w that Gunter was so 
en1ployed, and that after the death of Gunter, A. H. 
Ball wrote to Smith, representing the Noble Com-
pany, to Brome representing the Bragg Estate, and 
to Stockyards National Bank, suggesting the ap-
pointment of Cluff to represent him, ''the sa.me as 
Gunter had,'' to which they replied that "it was 
all right,'' the fair~ meaning of all of which is, that 
Cluff was appointed and hired as the representative 
of the owners and the predecessors of the plain-
tiffs, the same as Gunter had represented them, ·and 
not that Cluff was hired simp~ly as the personal at-
torney of Ball. If all that Ball desired was merely 
the employment of an attorney for himself, there 
\vas no occasion to write to the owners or to any-
one- about it. vV e thus say that the finding of the 
r-0.urt (Ab. 28) that after the death of Gunter, I..J. E. 
Cluff, an attorney at la,w, was employed by the pre-
decessors of the :plaintiffs to take the -place of At-
torney Gunter and that Cluff dre"r up the leas.e, 
Ex. 2'8, demising the pre·mises to Nick Floor, Inc., 
as lessee, to be and "rhich was signed by A. H. B'all 
for and on behalf of the predecessors of the plain-
tiffs, is well supported by the evidence. Until the 
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time of the trial of this cause, there is no evidence 
to show that Cluff at any time before was in the 
emp~loy of or repres.ented the defendant or in a-ny 
capacity had acted for it. None of the pleadings in 
the cause were signed by him and a.t the beginning he 
rlid not and had not appeared for the defendant. It 
was not until after the replies of the plaintiffs and 
on the first day of the trial of the caus:e that Cluff 
ap~peared as additional counsel for the defendant to 
defend the le·as.e which the plaintiffs (not their pre-
decessors) asserted was void. Nor is there any evL 
dence to support the statement of appellants that 
Ball ''at every stage rendered such help as he could 
to the defendant.'' To the contrary the evidence 
and reports submitted by him to the owners show 
that he handled and managed the premises to their 
hest interest and that the tenant occupying 79 
West 2nd South was a good tenant and promptly 
paid the rent 'vhich he did} a.s some of the p~rior ten-
ants had not done. The evidence further shows 
(Tr. 196-198) that Floor, in obtaining the lease, in-
dicated the kind of business he desired to carry on 
in the leaseq. premises and desired a lease longel' 
than merely from month to month. 
We recognize that there is some conflict in the 
evidence with respect to some or the s1atements 
I.eretofore ma.de. The plaintiffs called but two wit-
nesses. The first was Gould-Smith (Ab. 44). The 
direct examination was very brief. After showing 
he was the secretary and treasurer of the Noble 
Company, about all testified to by him was that no 
written authority was given by him to Arthur Ball 
(A. H. Ball) to give any lease. But see his cross ex-
amination (Ab. 45_-61), in which he testified con-
cerning the employment of H. T. Ball, and that 
after his death A. H. Ball was employed by the 
witness and by Gu.nter as the agent for the building 
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to look after it., collect the rents and make rep~airs 
for all of the owners. The cross examination is 
lengthy. From letters and reports and other things 
produc.ed by Smith and put in evidence as p·art of 
the cross examination, it clearly showed, and the 
'vitness testified, that A. H. Ball \Vas the agent for 
the o'vners; that Ball 'vas keeping1 him advised as 
to who the tenants were; sent him statements show-
ing that after September, 1933 he was _rec~iving 
$75.00 a month rental for the premises, in question, 
79 ''rest Second South Street, but testified that he 
did not notice that ''the defendant's rental. during 
the period of nearly four years'' was increased from 
$75.00 to $90.00 a month, when, at the same time, 
the monthly reports of rentals received by him 
showed that for nearly four years the defendant's 
rental was so increased. He further testified that 
Ball sent the portion of the monthly statements, of 
rentals of the Noble Company to him, and p·resumed 
he sent the Stockyards Bank their portion, as 
well as to others interested in the premises. 
The letters and reports furnished by Smith and 
put in evidence showed also rep·airs. made by Ball, 
the payment of taxes, the leasing of the premises, 
and even the borrowing qf money on behalf of the 
owners to pay taxes and rep·airs ; all of which were 
reported to Smith and were approved by him. On 
page 60 of the Abstract, the witness attempts to 
explain why he did not discover the increased 
rentals from $75.00 to $90.00, notwithstanding the 
reports of rentals each month showed such increa8e, 
for the reason, as he testified, that he did not follow 
the reports very carefully. 
He further testified that Ball had not told him 
that he had given leases, but "h·ad not asked him if 
he had given any;'' that they discussed the build-
jng and the rentals and the possibility of s.ales, and 
that ''on my instructions the bank would let him 
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{Ball) have the money, and my instructions were 
to pay the note from the rentals received;'' which 
instructions "\\rere carried out by Ball. A fair in-
terpretation of the testimony of this wit:p.ess, as 
disclosed by the transcrip~t, shows that he knew that 
;the defendant was in possession of the p~remises 
froin September, 1933 to and including the time the 
premises were sold in May, 1939, a period of nearly 
six years; that for the first three years defendant 
paid a rental of $75.00 a month, and for the next 
three years $90.00 a month; knew the manner in 
which A. H. Ball was handling the prop,erty, and 
leasing and collecting the rents, and that the tenant 
in possession of the leased p~remises No. 79 West 
SP.cond South, was so in possession under and in 
pursuance of a lease other than merely from month 
to month. 
The next witness produced by the plaintiffs, 
page 62 of the abstract, was William H. Dres.sler, 
who had a permanent residence at Omaha, and a 
temporary residence at Long Beach, California. 
In portions of his testimony, he testified that he 
'vas the grantee, together with Ford E. Hovey, of 
a conveyance made to them by the Stockyards N a-
tiona! Bank of South Omaha; that ''I don't think 
I wrote a letter to A. H. Ball, after his father's 
death, that I desired or requeRted said A. H. Ball 
to collect the rents und look after the property and 
carry on with the Ea.gle Block as his. fa.ther had 
done;" that he had not informed A. H. Ball, either 
orally or in writing that he could enter into a lease 
;.or leases other than from month to month (which 
was denied by the testimony of Ball), and that he 
'did not know that A. H. Ball had given a lease for 
a longer period until in June, 1939, when he 
learned sneh fact from the new owners; which 
als.o was denied by Ball. But again, see his 
cross examination (Abstract pages 63 to 66~ in-
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ciasive) . There, he testified that he had acquired 
a one-fourth interes.t. from the Stockyards National 
Bank in October, 1~)~9; that A.. H. Ball of Salt Lake 
'()ity ·lvas ·i·n chaTge of the building ~and that h.e had 
not Jnade any change ht the p·ersons or agents who 
we·re looking after the rental of the building and 
collecting the rents; that he had not done ~anythting 
to find o~tt .zvho the tenants ~vere, or what rents w-ere 
being paid; that he received ''a monthly financial 
~ta ten1ent sho\ving the amount of rents -collected 
and it::; disposition. I am attaching the statement 
('~f J anua1·y, 1939. The others are in the same 
form;'' that he was not acquainted with the father 
of A. H. Bill, but, so far as he knew, the father col-
lected the rents, paid the taxes., and disbursed th~ 
remainder to parties of interest;· and that after his 
death, the son looked after the renting of the build .. 
ing, the collection of rents and the disbursement of 
them; that Gunter '''vas not my attorney in looking 
after the building and employing agents.;'' that 
ihe had had no letters from Gunter, a;nd 
had not given A. H. Ball any instructions whatev.er 
regarding the renting of the building; and "did not 
instruct A. H. Ball to enter into a lease from month 
to month," in fact said he had not given Ball any 
instructions . He further testified he had ''no at-
torney in Salt Lake,'' and had no information of 
the giving of any lease by Ball until June, 1939, 
after the sale of the premises- which was denied 
by Ball. However, he further testified that-
''A. H. Ball was looking after my interest in rent-
ing the building. I did not make any inquiries. con-
cerning the tenants or the amount of rent they were 
paying. I dealt with A. H. Ball. I made no in-
quiries as to what leases the tenants had or what 
rentals \vere being paid;" that A. H. Ball collected 
the rent from the tenants and remitted the same to 
the various o'\\rners as their interest appeared; that 
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he made no inquiry of A. H. Ball as to the nature 
of the tenancy ·of any tenant; that he first came to 
Salt Lake City in November, 1937, met A. H. Ball 
,at that time, went to the Eagle Block with him, 
that Ball showed him the building from the ex-
terior and the ground that went with it; that he 
did not s.ee a single tenant; that he did not know 
if the defendant was a tenant in the building·; that 
he did not recall seeing the sign, '' Golden Gate 
Beer Garden, Nick Floor, Inc.''; that ''I made no 
inquiries a.s to the nature of the tenancy of the 
defendant. I did not see the improvements that 
the defendant had placed upon said premis,es. I 
did not know his rental was increased from $75.00 
to ·$90.00 per month;" that ''I acquired an interest 
in the property in question p~rior to May 15, 1935. 
At no time did I make any 'inquiry as to who the 
tenants were, what rent was. being p·aid, and the 
nature of the tenancy. The Stockyards National 
Bank conveyed a one-fourth interest to :me and 
others a.s trustees for liquidation." (Ab. 66). 
The testimony of this witness. was . given by 
deposition at Long Beach, California. He attached 
to his deposition a report for January, 1939. re-
ceived by him showing the amount of rental of the 
premises in question to be $90.00 a month, and 
that su-ch report of collections of rents, was the 
same as other reports of rentals received by him. 
l~rom the testimony of this witness, it is, not clear 
just when he acquired an interest in the premises. 
On his cross examination {Ab. 63) he testified that 
in October, 1929, ''a one-fourth interest was con-
veyed to me from the Stockyards National Bank 
of .. South Omaha.'" That is not true, for he him-
self further testified (A b. 66) that the ''Stock-
vards National Bank c.onveyed a one-fourth inter-
est to me and others, as trustees for liquiroa.tion. '' 
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He neYer had any interest other than that. of 
trustee, and as such he and Hovey, a.s trustees, 
'conveyed an undivided one-fourth interest in and 
to the Eagle building or block to the plaintiffs. 
Ho"~ever, as already stated, after such conveyance, 
whatever the time the Stockyards. Bank conveyed 
to Dressler and Hovey, as trustees, in liquidation, 
whether in 1929 or at some other time p~rior to 
1935, such interest of the Stockyards National 
Bank as between the parties., was still carried on 
1n the nan1e of the. bank until the conveyance to the 
plaintiffs. (See letter of ~fay 11, 1936, part of Ex. 
2:i, wherein ·w. H. Dressler, as oa.shier of the 
l)tookyards National Bank. addressed a letter to 
_A_. H. Ball at Salt Lake City for and on behalf or 
the bank; and too let it hP noticed, defendant's 
Ex. 1 where in May, 1932, a lease was pTep~ared 
by \Y·. T. (hmter to be and which was signed by 
:lt. H. Ball, as agent for the Stockyards National 
Bank of South Omaha~ W. P. ~oble Company and 
the Fred Bragg Estate). 
As thus disclosed by his cross examination this 
witness, from the time he as trustee acquired an 
interest in the pTemises and until the conveyance 
to the plajntiffs, had made no inquiry and knew 
nothing as to the tenants, their leases, possession or 
occupancy of the premises, knew nothing, did noth-
ing; like the traditional monk, saw not, heard not, 
spoke not, except for a period of six years without 
complaint or objection received from those in charge 
of the premises monthly reports of rentals and oth~r 
f-~tatements in the name of the Stockyards Naitonal 
Bank. What a trustee! ·What diligence exercised 
for and on behalf of his ces~tui que trust! 
It is not necessary in detail to refer to the evi-
dence adduced on behalf of the defendant, the tes--
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timony of A. H. Ball, and exhibits (direct exam-
ination A b. 88 to 99; Re~called 182; cross exam-
ination 85-87); and the testin1.ony of Nick Floor, 
(direct examination 88 to 101, and Exhibits, his 
cross examination 102-108). The contentions of 
a.pp~ellants are chiefly based on the te8timony of 
their witnesses and upon objections to the cross 
examination thereof, and objections to the testi-
mony and exhibits adduced on behalf. of the de-
fendant. They p·articularly claim that the lease 
(Ex. 28) given the defendant and executed by A. JI. 
Ball as agent for and on behalf of the Noble Com-
pany, the Fred Bragg Estate and the Stockyards 
National Bank was not executed for and on be-
half of the true or all of the owners as lessors, 
because, as they say, the bank before tha.t had con-
veyed its one-fourth interest to Dressler and Hovey, 
as trustees in liquidation, and that the lease was 
'not signed by any of the heirs of the Bragg Estate; 
and further, because no evidence was adduced as 
'they say, to show authority of A. H. Ball to ex-
'Ccute the lease for and on behalf of the owners or 
lessors. As to this, we refer particularly to the 
findings of the court (Ab. 28, 29, 30), which we 
submit are supported by ample and sufficient evi-
dence, though in particulars it may be claimed 
there is some conflict therein. 
In view. of such findings, the appellants may 
not fold their arms and proclaim that the defend-
ant must show some written instrument signed by 
the owners authorizing Ball to give a written lease 
for more than one year. The record shows. that 
from at least 1922 until the conveyance of the p~rem­
i~es to the plaintiffs in 1939, a period of 17 years, 
the parties· treated and referred to the one-fourth 
interest of the Braggs. as the "rred Bragg Estate" 
nnd in that name were all reports of rentals and 
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other reports and statements designated. (See de-
fl'ndant 's ~x. ~5; ~6, 27 and other numerous ex-
hibits) sent to and transnlitted to C. L. Brome, 
lt.ttorney for the Fred Bragg Estate and for the 
heirs thereof, and as such "\Yere received and 
ackno,vledged by him. A. H. Ball testified t;h.at 
l'rom the time he took charge of tlie premises in 
June, 1930, and until the- conveyance to the plain-
tiffs and "~hile he had full charge, management 
and handling of the premises he, and prior there ... 
to his father, so and in such name, remitted to 
Brome, as the attorney for the Fred Bragg Estate, 
1·eports of rentals and other reports and that the 
~arne were so received and a.cknowledg'ed by him. 
There does not seem to be any dispute a.s to that. 
From the time the Stockyards N a.tional Bank 
by foreclosure of its lien acquired its one-fourth 
interest in the premises, the exact time of which 
is not clearly shown, but which at least was. prior 
to May 5, 1932, and until the conveyance to the 
plaintiffs, reports of rentals as to th~ interest of 
the bank, as well as other reports and statements, 
twere tranEmitted to and in the name of the hank, 
or in the name of the bank in care of W. H. 
J)ressler, and as such were so recei,red and acknowl-
edged. A. H. Ball so testified and there does not 
seem to be any dispute as to that. ~d. without dis-
pute, it also was shown that whatever in~erest Dress-
ler and Hovey acquired in and to the bank's interest 
was only as trustees, and as trustees, and no_t other-
'vise, they conveyed an undivided one-fourth interest' 
to the p·la.intiffs ; and~ too, lPt it not be overlooked 
tl1nt the rentals and other benefits so transmitted to 
the bank and received by Dressler, were not only 
as to the interest he had, but for the whole of the 
undivided one-fourth interest acquired by both 
Dressler and Hovey as trustees, and without evi-
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dence to the contrary, of which there is none, it 
will be presumed Dressler a.ccounted to Hovey or 
to his cestui que trust for the whole of the rentals 
and benefits received for such undivided one-fourth 
tintere-st. No evidence was given to shQ"\V that 
Hovey had not consented to or acquiesced in all 
that his co-trustee had done, or that Hovey was 
\v~thout kn;owledge thereof. 
The numerous cases thus cited by the appel-
lants to the effect that one co-tenant cannot give 
·exclusive possession of an interest in real estate 
Without authority of other co-tenants, or to which 
'they had not consented or acquiesced therein, had 
not reeeived the benefits thereof and refused to 
he bound thereby, or cases where one of several 
trustees without the consent or acquiescence of 
other trustees conducted or transacted business 
for the cestui que trust and where the other trustees 
had no knowledge of such trans·actions and had not 
cons.ented or acquiesced therein and had not re-
ceived benefits therefrom and refused to be bound 
by such transaction, are not applicable to cases 
where as here such co-tenants or co-trus.tees had 
received benefits thereof, as here shown, that they 
had knowledge of the tenancy of the defendant for 
a period of nearly six years and ha.d received, with-
out comp•laint or objection, their just prop.ortion 
of the rentals and other benefits of such tenancy. 
Further as to this. Who here is complaining~ 
Certainly not trustee Hovey, nor even the tradi-
tional monk Dressler, nor the B,ragg Estate or any 
l1eir thereof, not even the Noble Company, nor the 
Btockyards Bank. Then 'vhy all this mess~ Let 
the Court look at the deeds, plaintiffs' Ex. A, B 
rD.nd c, whereby the Noble Company, the heirs of 
the Bragg Estate and the trustees Dressler and 
liovey conveyed the Eagh~ BloLi]c, i:ncludl.ng :the 
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premises in question, wherein they ' ' war ran ted 
irmnediate po.ssession to the grantees,'' notwith-
standing they knew of the posses.sion and occu-
paney of the defendant as a tenant for a period 
of nearly six years, and was in poss.ession when 
the deeds were made, and that the grantees them-
selves before they purchased the premises had full 
knowledge of the defendant's possession and occu-
y;ancy and of the terms and .conditions of its lease 
under which it was in possession and had made 
valuable improvements and well knew that under 
the tern1s of its lease the defendant was entitled 
to a continued possession of nearly two years more, 
and that it claimed the right for such period t~ 
continue in possession, and so the court found 
(Ab. 33-34), but notwithstanding all that, and with 
full kno,Yledge of the claimed rights of the defend-
ant, the plaintiffs, after such purchase, servP.d 
notice on the defendant to vacate the premises, and 
en his refusal to do so brought this action. 
It, therefore, is unnecessary to review the 
appellants' cited cases, for it is apparent that they 
!lave no application either to the record or to the 
findings. No doubt, the app~ellants may claim they 
can make the same defens.e and contentions against 
the defendant's lease and possession as the grant-
ors themselves could have done. Let it be so. 
1-Io,vever some of the representatives of the .grant-
ors by their testimony, sought to disclaim knowl~ 
edge of the defendant's lease and of its possession 
thereunder. But how stands the case as to the 
plaintiffs, who before they purchased the premises, 
indisputably had actual and full knowledge of the 
defendant's lease and of the defendant's posses-
sion thereunder and of th·e terms ap.d conditions of 
the lease and of the improvements and part per-
formance made by the defendant and of its claimed 
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right to continue in possession for nearly two 
years more~ We shall see, when. presently we con-
~ider the question of estopp~el. 
In view of all this, the appellants, neverthe-
less further say (their brief 21) that the defend-
ant had not a.cted in good faith. To sup~port that 
t.hey say that since he submitted the lease to his 
counsel, Mr. ICnowlton, ''we must believe that he 
(Floor) was told of the infirmities of the lease," 
because signed by an agent for and on behalf of 
the lessors. No claim is made of any evidence to 
show that :any information of such or of any in-
firmity of the lease was given Hoor or that the 
lease for the reason stated or otherwise was in-
firm. "They s.ay that he was bound to ascertain the 
·agent's authority to execute a lease for more than 
one year. Here A. H. Ball, who admittedly as the 
agent for the lessors, all of whom were non-
residents, had the management and handling of the 
premises .and had full charge thereof for them with 
authority to lease the p.remises and collect the rent-
:als, and that in such case what was so done by him 
in the course of his employment will, until the con-
trary is/ shown, be presumed to have been done with 
!authority. Had further inquiry been made by the 
defendant, it would have been dis.closed that A. H. 
Ball, since he had charge of the premises, gave 
wrjtten leases for a p~eriod longer than one year, 
;and as his father prior· thereto in charge of the 
premises for many years had done. The claim of 
~the defendant's bad faith is as groundless and un-
supported by the record as is. the furth'er statement 
of app1ellants in ~heir brief (page 30) that A. H. 
Ball'' at every stage rendered such help, a.s he could 
1to the defendant.'' There is not anything to justify 
.that. 
As heretofore sho,vn, the defendant, because 
of the business stated by him to be conducted on the 
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leased pre1nises, required something more than a 
mere month to month leas.e. ''7hen the lease was 
prepared by Cluff, the terms and conditions of the 
lease were discussed by J(no,vlton, counsel for de-
fendant, 'Yith Cluff and Ball representing the 
lessors, the defendant requesting a lease for five 
years, Ball willing to giYe one only for three yearH. 
Finally, they came to an agreement for a. lease for 
three years 'vith ali option for five additional 
years, provided the defendant on or before May 1, 
1935, made permanent improvements on the le~sed 
premises to the extent of $1,000.00. and- for sueh 
additional period to pay a monthly rental of $90.00 
instead of $75.00, and the lease so provided (Ab. 
14). For such three years, the lessors. without com-
plaint or objection received $75.00 a month, and for 
the next three years $90.00 without any claim that 
such rentals were not ~ntirely satisfactory. Talk 
about bad faith on the part of the defendant, when 
as the court found, and as presently will be shown 
supported by the evidence. that the defendant under 
the lease made valuable and permanent improve-
ments of the premises not only to the extent of 
$1,000.00, but in excess of $1, 700 .. 00 ( Ab. 31). 
ESTOPPEL 
Counsel for appellants (page 23 of their brief) 
further say that there was no evidence of an 
estoppel. We first refer to the findings of the court 
on the subject. Because the q~1estion of estopp·el 
is one of the most important and controlling ques-
tions in the case, we take the liberty here to set 
forth the court's finding in such resp·ect. The court 
found (A b. 31) : 
"That the defendant in virtue of the writ-
' ten lease attached to its answer and under 
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which it was put in possession of and 
occupied the premises, on or before May 
1, 1935 and in accordance with the terms 
and p~rovisions of the said lease, made per-
man·ent improvements. in said storeroom 
and basement so let and occupied by it, to 
the reasonable value in excess of the sum 
of $1,000.00, towit, more than $1,700.00, by 
putting in a maple hardwood floor, build-
ing new stairways, p·utting in toilets and 
partitions, installing electric wiring~ build-
ing and putting in new doors, putting in a 
valuable p~late glass window in front of the 
building, doing plumbing work and making 
sewer connections, putting in tiling and 
panel work, constructing a cement stair-
way, putting up valuable and p~ermanent 
awnings, doing inside and outside painting 
in p·res,ervation of the premises, laying and 
gluing to the floor valuable and durable 
linoleum, and making other valuable im-
provements and as in the additional answer 
of the defendant alleged, all of ~hich iln-
provements were attached to the building 
i ts.elf and were to be and to become part 
thereof, and were so intended to be made, 
none of which may be removed without in-
jury to the premises to which they are 
attached or without injury to the ·fixtures 
or permanent improvements themselves; 
and that such imp~rovements were made in 
consideration that the defendant, as stip-
ulated and provided in the said lease ex-
ecuted and delivered to it, was to be and 
was given an additional extension of time 
for a period of five years from Septem-
ber 25, 1936, or to and including Sep~tem­
her 25, 1941, and of the payment of $90.00 
a month rental instead of $75.00 for such 
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additional five-years' period from Septem-
ber 25, 1936, and that the defendant as 
rental on said premises paid to the pre-
decessors in interest of the plaintiffs and 
until the commencement of this action the 
sum of $90.00 a month instead of $75.00, 
"rhich payments 'vere so received by the 
predecessors in interest without any objec-
tion and "d.thout any claim made by them, 
or any of them, that the possession or 
oecupation of the defendant was without 
right or a mere tenancy from month to 
1nonth.'' 
Counsel by their brief do not refer to this find-
ing. . They say nothing about it. Nowhere is it 
~tated in their brief wherein the finding is not 
supported by the evidence. They say it was alleged 
~.bat the defendant in reliance upon its lease spent 
$1,000.00 in permanent improvements, and that such 
allegation was denied. True. But what they now 
say is that Ball concealed from the owners the fact 
of the defendant's lease. There is no evidence to 
show that, and none pointed to. They say the re-
ports of monthly collections of rent merely reported 
the monthly payments of 79 West Second South. 
Even that is not correctly stated. The monthly 
rental statements show rents received from numer-
ous parts of the building ~vithout showing the names 
,(1/ any of the tenants. The fact that the name -of 
1he defendant was not mentioned is thus of no con-
sequence. They then say Ball had not informed 
Smith of the lease given the defendant. But with-
out disp·ute it was shown that Smith directed Ball 
to handle the property just as his father had. His 
father gave written leases. No dispute as to that. 
'fhev further say Dressler testified that when he 
was· at Salt Lake City in November, 1937, and with 
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Ball went to the Eagle Block, Ball did not tell him 
anything as to the tenants or about the lease given 
the defendant. But Ball tes,tified he then told 
J)ressler about the. lease. However, we have al-
ready referred to the testimony of Pressler that 
he made no inquiry concerning the tenants, or what 
leas.e they had, not anything as to the management 
or handling of the property, made no inquiry, founa 
nothing, knew nothing. 
Smith, who· visited the premises several times 
while A. H. Ball had charge of them, testified that 
Ball told him he now had a good man in the p~rem­
ises, where theretofore they had a poor tenant, yet 
did not tell him under vvhat lease he was in posses-
sion. It is not made to appear that Smith asked 
him. The burden of the appellants' brief on this 
subject chiefly consists of characterizing Ball of 
''treachery to his p~rincipals in making the Floor 
lease and not reporting it," and that his failure 
to do so was ''a deliberate betrayal of the interest 
of his principals.'' We think this uncalled for. For 
years Gunter for the owners and lessors. prepared 
leases to be signed for and on their behalf by H. T. 
BrJl and A. Il. Ban. It is not made to appear that 
the leases or copies of them were sent or were re-
quired to be sent to the lessors. No complaint was 
made of that until after the Eagle building was con-
veyed to the plaintiffs,. who now complain, not,vith-
standing before they. purchased the premise-sr, they 
had actual knowledg~ of ilie defendant's posses-
sion, of his lease and of the terms and .conditions 
thereof, and tha.t a copy of the lease was submitted 
to their attorneys before they purchased the prem-
i~es. They thought they could "break it'' (Ah. 
108). ·Why chas.tise Ball and denounce him ·a traitor 
because he had not informed the lessors of the 
terms of the defendant 'R lease, "\\rhen the plaintiff~ 
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then1selv-es, before they purchased the premises, 
full ,,~ell knew of the terms and conditions of the 
lease, the possession of the defendant under it and 
the making of valuable and permanent imp.rove-
ments by him'? And too, neither of them took the 
witness stand to deny a word of it (Ab. 35). 
Space does not admit of detailed references to 
the numerous exhibits of monthly reports and 
statements transmitted by Ball to the lessors, nor 
to the correspondence had between them concern-
ing the handling and managing of the prop·erty by 
Ball, all of which was approved by the lessors. How-
ever, as to \\"'hat the p-redecessors of the plaintiffs 
knew as to the defendant's lease, the court made 
specific findings (~I\_ b. 29, 30, 31). Space does not 
admit here setting up such findings in haec verba. 
The court found that while there was no- positive or 
direct evidence that the predecessors of the p~lain­
fitfs saw the written leases executed by H. T. Ball 
or by A. H. Ball, nor the lease or a copy thereof 
of the defendant prepare-d by Cluff and signed by 
Ball for and on behalf of the lessors, yet the court 
found facts and circumstances from which the only 
reasonable inference deducible was that both H. T. 
Ball and A. H. Ball had right and authority to ex-
ecute the leases for and on behalf of the predeces~ 
sors of the plaintiffs and that they "\Vell kne)V that 
the possession of the defendant was something 
more than a mere lease from month to month, that 
rentals of the premises in question were collected 
by Ball from the same tenant and reported to the 
le~sors for the first three years at $75.00 a month, 
and thereafter for nearly three years and until thP 
premises ,vere conveyed to the- plaintiffs, a.t the rate 
of $90.00 a month. VV e submit the record well 
supports such findings. As to most of the facts so 
found, there does not see1n much, if any, dispute. 
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The reasonable inferences deducible therefro1n were 
peculiarly within the province of the trial court. 
lT nder recognized established rules of evidence, 
findings of ultimate facts may well he based and 
determined upon indirect evidence and upon reason-
able inferences deduced from other p~roven facts 
and circumstances. Many criminal offenders have 
properly been found guilty of the commission of 
offenses upon such character of evidence though 
there was no pos.i tive or direct evidence of guilt. 
No particular form or language is necessary to con-
stitute authority in writing. It may be gathered 
from letters and telegrams, etc. 
Fritsch v. Hess, 49 Utah 75; 162 P. 70, 
and may he inferred or deduced from surrounding 
facts and circumstances. 
The finding "\Vhich the court made a.s to valuable 
and piermanent imp~rovements and the character 
thereof made on the premises by the defendant under 
and in pursuance of his lease has already heen re-
ferred to. (Ab. 31). Floor testified with respect 
thereto in detail just what improvements, were 
1nade, by whom, and what they cost, and numerous 
bills, statements and checks concerning them were 
put in evidence. Ifis direct examination is found on 
page 88 to 101, and his cross examination 102 to 
108 of the abstract. His tes,timony more fully 
appears in the transcript "\vhere references are made 
to exhibits put in evidence by hjm with respect to 
the imp~rovements made, consisting of defendant's 
exhibits 31 to 40 inclusive. Some bf these exhibits 
show not only permanent improvements made, but 
also the movable fixtures not claimed as permanent 
improvements. These the witness distinguished. 
J\s to the permanent improvements, (Tr. 2t2, et 
seq.) Floor testified that he expended for tiling 
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around the front of the building $183.25; (Tr. 275 
io 285), that he expended for a new maple floor, 
partitions, laYatories in the basement, sewer con-
nections and plumbing .. , paneling, painting, stair-
ways and cement steps $775.00; additional panel-
ing $25.00;· changing doors in rear room and new 
doors, $20.00; (Tr. 291, et seq.), transome and 
screens, $~2.50; partition, s'vinging doors, large,· 
new glass in front of the building, and doors in the 
basement, $152.35; (Tr. 296), expended for neces-
sary modern electrical wiring and making connec-
tions, $181.85; putting up awnings, $56.25; ( Tr. 
299), painting the outside three coats, $61.00; for 
other floors, papering, hinges, linoleum glued to 
the floor and different other items concerning per-
Jnanent improvements, ·$97.2{); (Tr. 304., et seq.), 
that he spent about $55.60 for screen doors and 
lumber, paperhanging and for other minor per-
manent improvements, amounting in all to the sum 
of $1,746.26. All these imp·rovements, and as found 
by the trial court, were attached to the building it-
self and were to be and to become a part thereof 
and so intended to be when made~ and none of which 
may he removed without injury to the premises to 
which they are attached or 'vithout injury· to the 
permanent fixtures themselves. 
In addition to such improvements, Floor testi-
fied he also expended about $237.50 for booths in 
the front p~art of the building, .about $7/5.00 for 
cigarette cases and arches, about $72.00 for tables, 
$430.00 for booths in the back p·art of the buildings., 
installed a bar and mirror, and made numerou~ 
other improvements, in all, amounting to sorrjething 
like $3,000.00 or $4,000.00, non~ of which considered 
or claimed to be p·ermanent improvements; and that 
the permanent improvements consisted of those 
found and enumera.ted by the court, Abstract 31, and 
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upon which were expeD:ded, as. the court found, more 
than $1, 700.00, and as testified to by the witness con-
sisted of about $1, 750.00. 
It will be noticed by the cross examination of 
witness Floor that many questions were- asked him 
eoncerning moneys expended for equipments in the 
building, put there by the defendant which in no 
.sense were claimed by him as permanent imp·rove~ 
ments, but the witness. otherwis.e in his testimony 
.~learly indicated those which were regarded as per-
manent imp~rovements and as found by the court, 
and those which "\vere regared as mere movable trade 
fixtures. 
But say appellants in their brief, the improve-
ments made. were not permanent, were not fixtures 
·so a.ttached to the building as to become a part 
thereof, and further say that the defendant had 
not expended $1,000.00 in making them, or that they 
were not in value $1,000.00. The record shows that 
neither the value nor the character of the improve .. 
ments as testified to by Floor was dis})uted. No 
witness on the subject was called by the plaintiffs. 
As found by the court and as testified to by Floor, 
authorities need not be cited to justify the conclu-
sion that such improvements so attached to the 
realty became a part thereof, at least by far thet 
greater part thereof as enumerated by the findings, 
and that they were in value at least the sum of 
$1,000.00. But see 
'26 C. J. 657, ·Sec. 4, Subdivs. III-IV; 658, 
666, Annotation 39; A.L.R. 1044. 
Appellants .cite Brice v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86; 86 Pac. 
765 as supporting their view that the claimed per-
manent fixtures were mere trade fixtures. All 
that is required to see that the case has no applica-
tion is to note the difference between the nature 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
and character of the improvements there and here 
inYolved. So, too, as to the citation of other cases 
on the subject by the appellants. That the in1-
provements 'Yere in fact made as, found by the 
court and as testified to by Floor is not disputed. 
'That they 'Yere made for and in consideration of an 
option of an additional five years' extension of the 
defendant's lease and the payment of $90.00 in-
stead of $75.00 during such extended p·eriod also, 
is also not disputed. Who but a moron would enter 
into a lease to make p~rmanent imp·rovements of 
the value of $1,000.00 on a mere month to month 
1ease J? \\no but a moron on a mere month to month 
lease would even make and put into the building 
mere trade fixtures to the value of from $4,000.00 
cr more, not knowing hoV\r soon he might be noticed 
to vacate the premises' 
Counsel further say that no notice was given 
the le~sors themselves as to the exercise of the 
option as provided by the lease. As to tha.t" the 
record discloses without dispute that A. H. Ball, 
who had charge and management of the property 
and was authorized to make leases and to collect 
rentals, had notice and knowledge of the exercise of 
the option by the defendant and of the making of 
permanent improvements under and in pursuance 
of the lease by the defendant· on or before May 1, 
1935, and approved the same. The record also 
~hows that :rvfiss Noble, the p·resident of the Noble 
Company, also visited the premises and was told 
and shown of the improvements being made by the 
defendant and express·ed approval thereof. The 
record also shows without dispute that the lessors 
for the first three years of the tenancy of the de-
fendant received rentals at the rate of $715.00 a 
' ~ 1nonth, and thereafter for nearly three years, re-
ceived rentals at the rate of $90.00 a month. We 
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submit that notice to an agent such as Ball, having 
the exclusive management and control of the prem_ 
is.es and in handling the property for and on behalf 
of the lessors, was sufficient notice to the lessors. 
of the exercise of the option. Nor does. it lie in the 
mouth of the lessors after accepting and claiming, 
as they do, the benefits of the m~de P'ermanent im-
provements, to now declare that they were not per-
sonally notified of the exercise of the option. 
In view of the findings. of the trial court and 
of the authority conferred upon Ball with the ex-
clusive mana.gement and handling of the prope.rty, 
as hereinbefore indicated, the rule indicated by 
ap·pellan ts in their brief and cases .cited to the 
effect that knowledge of the ag,ent may not be im-
puted to the princip,al when the third party, here 
the defendant, knew that the agent had no authority 
to make the contract, has here no application, for 
that there is no evidence that the defendant was 
possessed of any such knowledge, ana lurther be-
cause of the findings of the trial court supported by 
ample evidence that Ball was clothed with author .. 
ity to give leases, as his father had done, and that 
for many years written leases were -given both by 
H. T. B:all and A. H. Ball, and from other .p.roven 
facts and circumstan(jes · the only reasonable· de ... 
ducible inference is and as found by· the court, that 
the lessors and predecessors of the plaintiffs had 
knowledge thereof.· In view of all the facts and 
circumstances in evidenee and of the general a.gency 
conferred upon both H. T. and A. H. Ball, it is al-
most incredible to believe otherwise, or that the pre-
decessors of the plaintiffs for twenty years were 
ignorant thereof, or p·aid so little attention to the 
management and handling of the property as not 
to know thereof, and that it was wen within the 
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proYince of the trial court to deduce the inference 
and deductions as found by the court. 
Further as to the question of fixtures. If the 
posses,sion of the defendant should now be ter-
minated or t.ernrinated at the end of the additional 
five years, no one would he b<>ld enough to assert 
that the defendant, "Tithout the consent of the plain-
tiffs, could ren1ove any of the improvements found 
by the trial court and attached to the realty as 
permanent improvements, and that if in such -case 
the defendant undertook to do so, s.wift indeed 
''Toulcl tl1e plaintiffs be seeking .injunc)t\ive relief 
to prevent such removaL 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
"\\__,. e come now more particularly to the statute 
of frauds, 33-5-1, R. S. 1933, relied on by the appel-
lants. In fact, their contention chiefly is based 
upon the ~ta.tute that an estate or interest in real 
property of any one, other than leases for a term 
not exceeding one year, can be created only . . . ''by 
his la\\rful agent thereunto authorized by writing.'' 
In considering the statute, let the Court also keep· 
in mind 33-5-8 wherein it is p.rovided that "nothing 
in this chapter contained shall be construed to 
abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific 
performance of ag'reements in cas.e of part p.erform-
anee thereof.'' Let it also be noted that at common 
la'v and under the practice of ancient courts in 
E-quity, law and equity could not be administered 
in the same forum and in the same action. and that 
both legal :and equitable defens.es could not be inter-
nosed in an action at law. But under the code, 
. 
104-9-5, R. S. 1933, 
both legal and equitable defenses may be interposed 
to a complaint, whether at law or in equity. Here, 
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an equitable estoppel was interposed. No contention 
is or could be made ag1ainst that. It is predicated 
upon part performance, receip,t of benefits, upon 
acts and conduct constituting an estoppel, and on 
1the doctrine that to permit the interposition of the 
statute of frauds by the plaintiffs, in effect, 
amounted to a fraud upon the defendant. Let it 
be assumed that .A .• H. Ball had no express author-
ity in writing to execute and deliver the lease in 
question to the defendant. Yet, in view of the find-
ings of the trial court and upon the record, the ex-
clusive management and control of the p·remis.es by 
A. H. Ball, and prior thereto by his father, and 
where, as found by the court, written lea.ses were 
made by both H. T. and A. H. Ball, under circum-
~stances where it may reasonably be inferred that 
the predecessors of the plaintiffs had knowledge 
thereof, and without objections from tinie to time 
received rentals and benefits of leases made and ex-
ecuted by H. T. and A. H. Ball and received rentals 
and benefits for six years from the defendant, and 
the making of valuable and permanent improve-
ments as heretofore indicated, clearly constituting 
part p·erformance upon his part, how stands the 
case~ This, therefore, is not a case merely where 
it is sought to hold the principal on an unauthor-
ized conveyance of his lands or his interest therein, 
stripp·ed from all acts and conduct, benefits. re-
ceived, part p~erformance and elements of an estop-
pel, things not involved in many of the cases cited 
by counsel for the appellants.. 
As we understand, counsel for appellants do 
not dispute the rule or doctrine that benefitR re-
c~ived ard kept, or that p·art performance or ac-
quiescence in an unauthorized contract or lease, or 
tha.t acts and conduct amounting to an estoppel do 
take the cas.e out of the operation of the statute 
oi frauds. But whether counsel for the app·ellants 
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do or do not dispute the proposition, such, we under .. 
:stand, is the "'ell established rule, whether the con-
tract t~ l'Pga:~:ded us ,-oid or only voidable, if the 
contract itself is not illegal or against morals1 or 
-public policy, or ultra vires, or one 'vhich the p~re­
decessors of the appellants could not themselves 
haYe lawfully made. In 
25 R. C. L. at page 261, and under Sec. 62, 
the author discusses the que8tion that in England 
a deliYery of possession pursuant to an agreement 
is in itself such part performance as to take the 
case out of the operation of the statute of frauds, 
citing eases, but that the American decisions are 
not in harmony on such question, that many of the 
... -\merican courts follow the English rule, some do 
not, some requiring something in addition to mere 
taking possession. Then on page 264, Sec. 65, th~ 
author further says that though, a.s has been seen, 
the courts are not in harmony as. to the sufficiency 
of possession alone to constitute part performance, 
but that there seems to be practically no diversity 
of opinion where possession is ta.ken under the con-
tract in pursuance thereof and continued, and 
accomp·anied by lasting and valuable improvements 
of the premises, that the case is taken out of the 
operation of the statute of frauds, that the entry 
into possession and the making of the improvements 
are held to amount to such an alteration in the pur-
rhaser 's position (here the lessee) as. will warrant 
the courts entering a decree of specific performance, 
in support of \Yhich the author under Notes 14 and 
15, and especially under 15, cites many cases from 
n1any different jurisdictions. In 
27 C .. J., page 343, Sec. 427, 
under the subject, ''Statute of Frauds,'' the author 
says that where one party to an oral contraet has 
b1 reliance thereon, so far performed his part of 
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the agreement that it would be perp·etuating a fraud 
upon him to allow the other party to repudiate the 
contract and to set up the statute of frauds, in jus-
tification thereof, equity will regard the case as 
being remov~d from the operation of the statute 
.and vvill enforce the contract. In support of that 
very many cases are cited from many different 
jurisdictions. In 
21 C. J., page 1206, under the title, "Estop-
pel, '' Sec. 207, 
the author says that where one having the right to 
accept or reject a transaction, takes and retains 
benefits thereunder, he ratifies the transaction, is 
bound by it and cannot avoid its oblig~ation or effect 
by taking a p.osition inconsistent therewith, in sup-
port of which very many cases, are cited from many 
~different jurisdictions. And in Sec. 209, that a 
party to a transaction cannot ordinarily affirm it 
in part and in part disaffirm it, and that with re-
gard to rights claimed under a contract, etc., a party 
will not be allowed to assume the inconsistent posi-
tion of affirming the contract in p.art and disaffirm-
ing it in part, etc. And in Sec. 211, it is said that 
it has frequently been held that a p~erson by the 
-acceptance of benefits may be es.topped from ques-
tioning the existence, validity .and effect of a con-
tract, and that such app.lies to a contention made 
that the contract was void and in violation of the 
~statute of frauds, in support of which again very 
rnany cas.es are cited from many different juris-
dictions. In 
5 Pomeroy Equity Juris. (2d Ed.) page 
5011, Sec. 2243, 
the author also states that while the authority of 
the English and many American cases undoubtedly 
Rupport the view that possession alone is sufficient 
to take a case out of the- operation of the statute of 
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frauds;, but that there is a diversity of opinions by 
the .... \merican cases as to that, but, says the author, 
that the rule is nearly universal holding that pos-
session coupled with the making of valuable im-
prov-ements is sufficient part performance to take 
the case 'Yithout the operation of the statute of 
frauds, and at Note 26 cites very many cases from 
many different jurisdictions. In 
1 ~Iecham on Agency (2d Ed.) at p~age 316, 
Sec. 435, 
the author s~ys that one who voluntarily accepts 
the \vhole or any part of the proceeds of an act done 
by one assuming, though without authority, to he 
his agent, n1ust ordinarily be deemed to ratify the 
act and take it as his own with all its burdens, as 
\vell as of its benefits, that he may not ordinarily 
take the benefits and reject the burdens, but must 
~ither accept thP,m or reject them as a whole. Again 
the author .cites very many cases from ma~y. juris-
dictions, including 
Gutheil v. Gilmer, 27 Utah 496. 
Then at Sec. 436, the author further says that when 
the principal discovers that there has come into his 
hands the proceeds of an unauthorized act done by 
one who assumed therein to act as his agent, to 
voluntarily retain s.uch proceeds is, ordinarily to 
-ratify the act, citing cases. In 
Hargreaves v.. Burton, 59 Utah 575; 206 
Pac. 262, 
hy the syllabus it is stated with respect to the stat-
ute of frauds, that where a defendant in an action 
to quiet title relied on an oral contract for the pur-
chase of the property, he must prove a certain, def-
inite and unambiguous contract and also such acts 
in part performance thereof as in equity are con-
sidered sufficient to take the case out of the stat-
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ute. Here, the lease pleaded and relied upon is! in 
writing, though let it be ass:umed unauthorized, yet 
it is certain, definite and unambiguous. There id 
no doubt as to that, and so, too, do we contend that 
the nature and cha.racter of the imp-rovements made 
in pursuance of the contract and in excess of 
$1,000.00 were of such character and natute a.s to 
be valuable and permanent improvements. ·In 
Hogan v. Swayze, 65 Utah 380; 237 P·ac. 
1097, 
the doctrine as heretofore stated, is well recognized 
by the Supreme Court of this State and wherein, 
among other things, it is stated hat specific per-
formance will be decreed even in favor of a donee 
of parol gift Qf land where gift is followed by pos-
sess-ion and substantial improvements in reliance 
thereon. The doctrine that possession and part p.er-
formance in pursuance of an oral or unauthorized 
·contract is also r~cognized in 
Lynch v. Coviglio. 17 Utah 106; 53 Pac. 
983, 
as taking the case out of the op,eration of the stat-
ute of frauds. 
Valuable annotations are appended in 
33 A.L.R. page 1489, 
to the cas.e of Hargreaves v. Burton. sup~ra, sup-
porting the same doctrine. There the annotator 
:says that though the courts in a few :Jurisdictions 
tlo not recognize the doctrine, it is the generally 
accepted view that part p.erformance of a parol con-
tra.et or the sale, gift or leasing of land, has under 
certain circumstances the effect of taking the con-
tract out of the operation of the statute of frauds 
so that chancery may decree its sppcjfie perform-
ance if the remedy at law would be inadequate and 
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the contract is one "\vhich, if in writing, would be 
enforceable in equity; that the principle on which 
.rests this exception to the statute of frauds which 
1nakes a 'vritten contract essential to a valid agree-
ment to convey land is that a court of equity will 
not permit the use of the statute to perpretr~te a 
practical fraud. The annotator then cites and re--
Vie\YS cases in jurisdictions where imp-rovements 
were not essential to part performance, citing cases. 
Then the annotator refers. to what contracts the 
doctrine was applicable and s,tates that the rule 
,\~as '\Veil settled both in England and in America 
that if the vendee under a verbal agreement for 
the purchase of real estate expends labor or money 
in imp-roving the same, the contract is thereby'par-
tially performed and the statute of frauds has no 
application to it, citing many cases from nearly 
every State in the Union, including Utah. The 
author there also cites .cases as to the character of 
the improvements, that the improvements must be 
permanent and valuable, and then refers to par-
ticular improvements, to which we particularly call 
attention; among others, to the case of 
Friberg v. Bjelland, 95 Ore. 3.20; 182 Pac. 
1113, 
where the author says that in that case it appeared 
that the lessee had the interior of.the house painted 
and tinted, had some cloHets made 'in the house and 
put in some additional electric lights and wiring, 
spending about ·$150.00 on the house before he 
rnoved in and paig his monthly rental of $20.00, and 
that the Court there said: 
''An action at law would not afford the 
plaintiff adequate relief. It would be in-
equitable to permit the pla.intiff to be 
ejected from the dwelling before the ex-
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piration of the time orally agreed upon for 
the lease. There was a definite agreement 
between the parties, for a lease for the 
term of six years at .a rental of $20.00 per 
month. By the terms of the Ieas.e, the 
lessee wa.s" to make "whatever repairs or 
alterations· he_ might desire, in order to fit 
the dwelling for the use during that period. 
Relying upon the contract, and in compli-
ance therewith, plaintiff took possession 
of the premises,. and within a short time 
expended the sum of $330.00 in repairs and· 
alterations of the house and the construc-
tion of a g,arage on the lot. Such outlay 
Btrongly indicates that Friberg had an 
understanding or contract with Mr. Bjel-
land for a lease of the p-remises for a p.er-
iod of more than one year, or he would not 
have expended a sum of money greatly in 
excess of· one year's rental. The refusal by 
the defendant to perform the agreement 
operates as fraud' upon the rights of plain-
tiff.'' 
The annotator also refers to other cases from Wis-
ccnsin, ·Washington, Missouri and Illinois to the 
same effect. 
Extended notes· are also found app.ended to thP 
case of 
Hallig·an v. Frey, reported in 49 L.R.A .. 
(N. S.) 113, 
and· where the annotator s.ays that the great weight 
of authority was to- the effect that equity would in-
iervene to protect the rights of one who has taken 
an oral lease. out of the statute of frauds by part 
performance, citing many, many cases. See also 
notes in 
3 L.R'.A. (N. S.) 790. 
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In 31 L.R.A. (N. S.), page 738, 
the author under the subhead of ''Ratification or 
Estoppel'' says, that even though the selling and 
leasing of property belonging to a banking associa-
tion be not considered as within the ordinary 
powers and duties of a bank cashier, such a sale or 
lease may be ratified by the acts and conduct of the 
board o~ directors, or the bank may become estopped 
from questioning the authority of its cashier, so 
as to render a contract entered into by him the 
contract of the bank. 
To some extent the case of 
Jacksonville M .. P. Ry~ & Navig~ation Co. v. 
Hooper, 160 U.S. 512; 40 L. Ed. 515, 
rs here applicable, wherein by the syllabus it is 
stated that a company is bound by a lease signed 
for it by its president, although there was no proof 
that he was authorized to do so by a resolution of 
the board, where the company took possession of 
the premises, rented a portion thereof.- and received 
and receipted for the rent. 
In the case of 
Tobias v. Towle, (Wash.) 35 Pac. (2d) 
1114, 
the syllabus says that where agent leased premises 
ior Lranch office in name of his principal, carried 
on business in his name and had ap.parent general 
authority, the principal held estopped to . deny 
liability for delinquent rent on ground that agent 
had no actual authority to sign lease, and that a 
principal 'vho intrusted agent with app·arent gen-
eral authority to sign lease could not accept ben-
efits of agent's contract without incurring its 
obligations. In 
Simpson v. Nelson, (Colo.) ; 208 Pac. 455, 
it wa.s held tha.t a landowner's acceptance of money 
paid a.s interest under a lease and option to buy 
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executed by her deceased· husband without her 
written authority constituted ratification of the 
contract of sale sufficient to justify determinations 
for lessee in suits involving his· right to enforce 
op.tion. In 
Carnahan v. M. J. & B. M. Buck Co., 
(~1ich.); 229 N. W. 513., 
it was held that where- a lease is one that the cor-
poration might make, the corporation could ratify 
the lease, and where the corporation ratified the 
lease by acquies.cence, the corporation was estop·ped 
to s.ay that it was· not bound under the lease; that 
directors of corporation will be charged with 
knowledge of- which it was their duty to know; that 
directors. of corporation. occupying premises and 
pay;ing. rent. must be held to know of lease and its 
te.rms and of occupancy and. p~aying rent. 
In the case of· 
Fine Arts Corp. v. Kuchins Furniture Mfg. 
Co., (Mich.) ; 257 N. W. 823, 
it was held that though a lease was void under the 
statute of frauds becaus.e not authorized by an 
ag~nt in writing, yet held the lease ratified by the 
lessor's letters acknowledging agent's authority 
B.nd demanding payment of rent. On the question 
of ratification of a contract made by an agent un-
authorized to make it, see also 
Stuart v~ Mattern, (Mich.); 105 N. W. 35. 
If it is desired to further pursue the subject, 
we cite 
Fudicker v. Glenn, 237 Fed. 808. 
Peterborough R. Co. v. Nashua & L. R. Co., 
59 N.H. 835. . 
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Alexander v. Culbertson Ir. & Water Power 
Co., 61 Nebr. 333; 85 N. W. 283. 
\"Vest v. \Y ashing1on & C. River R. Co., 49 
Ore. 436; 90 Pac. 666. 
King v. "';:est Coast Grocery Co., 72 Wash. 
132; 129 Pac. 1081. 
Manchester Marble Co. v. Rutland R. R. 
Co., (Vt:); 136 Atl. 394 .. 
Hagar v. Home Stores, Inc., (Cal.); 2.59 
Pac. 1007. 
Zenos v. Britten Cook Lan_d & L. S. Co., 
(Cal.); 242 Pac. 914. 
Portland Cattle Ln. Co. v. Hansen L. S . Co., 
(Ida.); 251 Pac. 1051. 
Cache Valley.Banking Co. v. Logan B. P. 
0. E., (Utah) ; 56 Pac. (2d) 1046. 
As heretofore stated, the defendant's lease was 
not merely executory. For six years p.rior to the 
purchase by the plaintiffs it was executed and per-
formed by the defendant in g~ood faith, well believ-
ing that the lease gave the defendant the rigb.t to 
occupy and possess the premises under the terms 
and conditions specified in the leas,c. If anything 
is established by this law suit, that is; notwiths,tand-
ing the asserted conclusions of counsel for the 
Hppelants to the contrary, or their ass.ertions that 
the. improvements made were on.!y for the defend-
ant's enjoyment of the p.remises. as. and for a month 
to month leaS"e, or were: mere removable trade fix-
tures.. Should there be any doubt that the nature 
and character of the improvements as found by the 
court and enumerated by its findings and as. testi-
fied to by Floor were permanent improvements and 
henefic1al to the freehold, wef in addition to the 
text and cases heretofore cited" also cite 
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Parker v. }Vulstein, (N. J. Eq.); 21 Atl. 
623. 
0 'Neill v. Lyric Amusement Co., 119 Ark. 
454; 178 s. w. 406. 
Jones v. Harsha, 225 Mich. 416; 19.6 N. W. 
624. 
Modern Music ·Shop v. Concordia Fire Ins. 
Co., 226 N.Y. S. 630. 
Black Hdwe. Co. v. Commissioner of Inter-
nal Rev., 39 Fed. (2d) 460. 
We thus say that both the predecessors of the 
plaintiffs and the plaintiffs themselves are estopped 
from asserting that the defendant's lease is void 
under the statute of frauds., and that to p·ennit 
the plaintiffs to interpose the· statute is tantamount 
to permitting them to perpetrate a fraud upon the 
defen~ant. However~ if for any reason it can he 
considered that the predecessors of the plaintiffs 
were not estopped because of want of knowledge 
of the defendant's lease until after the premises 
'vere conveyed to the plaintiffs., then we say that 
the plaintiffs nevertheless are themselves estopp~ed, 
because it was indisputably shown by the record 
and as found by the court, that prior to the pur-
chase of the premises, they had visited the prem-
ises, talked with Floor, the mana.g,er of the defend-
ant, concerning the defendant's possession and of 
its lea.se and of its. claimed right to continue in 
possession until 1941, and 'vere informed of the 
terms and conditions of the lease and a copy there-
of submitted to plaintiffs' attorney, all before they 
purchased the p·remises, and so the court found and 
stated its conclusions of law. (A b. 38). 
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ATTORNEY'S FEES 
As already indicated, the court, by its findings, 
.conclusions and judgment, held the defendant's 
lease valid, and that the plaintiffs were estopped 
from asserting its invalidity. ~rhe lease, among 
other things, provided that ''either party agrees 
to pay all costs and attorney's fees and expenses 
incurred by the other tha.t shall arise from enforc-
ing tll e cove.nants of this lease,'' and by reason 
the_reof, the defendent alleged that if the plaintiffs' 
complaint be dismissed, the defendant be allowed 
$500.00 att0rney's fees, which the court found was 
tStipulated by the parties in open court to be a rea~ 
sonable attorney's fee for the purp·ose (F1inding 
9; A b. 36), and evidence also was given to show that 
$500.00 was a reasonable attorney's fee (Ab. 98). 
Thus the court, by its judgment, allowed the de-
fendant $500.00 as an attorney's fee by reason of 
such provision in the lease and stipulation of 
counseL 
The appellants now say there was no p·rivity 
between the plaintiffs and the defendant, and 
that the proVIsion for attorney's fees was 
not a covenant running with the land. Here 
the appellants again assert that the lease was 
not executed by Ball on behalf of the true 
owners and lessors, that is, that it was executed on 
behalf of the Stockyards National Bank, the Noble 
Company and the Fred Bragg Estate, when as they 
say, only the Noble Company -constituted a real 
O\vner and lessor. ·We heretofore have gone over 
that, and have shown that the interest of the Stock-
yards National Bank, prior to S.ep·tember, 1933, and 
at all times subsequent thereto and until the con-
veyance of the prop-erty to the plaintiffs, was still 
earried on in the name of the Stockyards National 
Bank and that the parties so treated the bank as 
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still the owner of a one-fourth interest in the Eagle 
Block; that the one-fourth interes,t of the Fred 
]3ragg Estate and of all of the heirs interested in 
that estate p·rior to 1933 and at all times subsequent 
thereto, was treated by the parties and carried on 
in the name of the Fred Bragg Estate including 
the heirs, and that all the dealings with respect 
thereto were had with attorney Brome, represent-
ing the esta.te and all the heirs thereof. We have 
also shown tha.t Dressler and Hovey, to whom it 
was said the Stockyards National B·ank conveyed 
its one-fourth interest, were mere trustees, and only 
as such conveyed the same to the plaintiffs, and 
that they at no time otherwise had any right, title 
or interest in or to the property. Since the· parties 
thus through all theii:· negotiations prior to 1933 and 
at all time p,rior to the conveyance to the plain-
tiffs,, treated and regarded the Noble Company as 
owning one-half of the conveyed pTemises to the 
plaintiffs, the Stockyards National Bank a.s one-
fourth and the Fred Bragg Estate one-fourth. the 
lease signed and executed by A. H. Ball as. the 
agent for and on behalf of the lessors and p·re-
decessors of the plaintiffs, the court. was justified 
in holding that the lease was made for and on be-
half of the real owners and lessors of the premises. 
·At no time during all of such period had the par-
ties personally dealt 'vith the heirs of the Bragg 
Estate, but for and on their behalf dealt with 
Brome, repres.ertting the Fred Bragg Estate, and 
including all persons interested in the estate. So, 
too, so far as concerns the Stockyards N-ational 
Bank, the p~arties during all of such period, de·alt 
with and had all the transactions in the name of 
the Stockyards National Bank and not in the name 
of the trustees. 
We think the finding and conclusion of the 
court were well justified. That being so, much of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
the complaint made as to attorney's fees is ground-
less. The finding and conclusion being· justified, 
there was privity between the plaintiffs and the 
defendant. Strange it is, that while the plaintiffs 
claim the benefits of the lease, so far as receiving 
and accepting the increased rentals of $90.00 a 
month for the additional period s.tipulated in the 
lease and until the conveyance of the premises to 
the plaintiffs, as well as claimin~ its benefits for 
the purpose of showing the relation of tenancy be-
t,Yeen the defendant and the predecessors of the 
plaintiffs, yet for all other purposes seek to reject 
the lease. They say that there was no provision 
in the grants that the plaintiffs took the property 
subject to the lease. As heretofore shown, (See 
defendant's Exhibit 41), the substance of the de-
fendant's lease was put on record in the· office of 
the County Recorder May 1, 1939, about a month 
prior to the purchase of the premises by the plain~ 
tiffs; and as further heretofore shown, the plain .. 
tiffs had actual knowledge of the defendant's lease 
and of the terms and conditions thereof and of its 
possession thereunder, and of course, took the 
premises, when they purcl1ased them, subject to the 
lease. The app.ellants do not contend the contrary, 
but what they, all through this law suit,. maintain~d 
'vas that the lease was void because not exeicuted 
by an agent having \\rritten authority so to do. That, 
the court, by its findings, conclusions and judg-
ment, found and a~judged against ~the plaintiffs. 
Ap·pellants further say there is no contra.ct lJe-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendant. They 
allege in their complaint that on September 25, 1933, 
the Noble Company, Hovey and Dressler as trust-
ees, and the heirs of the Bragg Estate ''leased, de-
mis,ed and let to th'e defendant the p·remises" in 
question ''from month to month at a .monthly 
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rental of $70.00, and that on or about the 1st day 
of May, 1935, by mutual agreement, the rental was 
fixed at $90.00 per month,'' and that by such owners 
the premises were conveyed to the plaintiffs on the 
3ls,t day of May, 1939. The plaintiffs thus allege 
a contract between the parties. But as heretofore 
shown, there wa.s no such contract: that the only 
contract between the predecessors of the plaintiffs 
,and the defendant was the lease executed and de-
livered to the defendant for a term of years and as 
alleged in the defendant's answer, being defend .. 
·ant's Exhibit 28. And as heretof0re shown, it is 
under that lease, and not otherwise, that any rela-
tion of tenancy is now claimed by the plaintiffs. as 
having existed between the plaintiffs' predecessors 
and the defendant and under which they justified 
the right of plaintiffs' predecessors in receiving 
the rental of $90.00 a month for the extension of 
the additional period of five years of the terms 
of the lease. So that when the plaintiffs purchased 
the premises,, they took them subject to such lease. 
Then the appellants say the provision in the 
leaS'e providing for a.tt.orney's fees was not a cov-
enant running with the land, that it was. a mere 
personal covenant of the lessors and predecessors 
of the plaintiffs, and hence not binding on the 
plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs, before they. purchased the 
premises, having had both actual knowledge and 
constructive notice of the terms and conditions of 
the lease under which the defendant was in pos-
session, and knowledge of the permanent improve-
ments, made by the defendant under and in pur-
suance of the lease, did so subject to .the lease and 
~ubject to all rights, privileges and equities. pos-
sessed by the defendant. In such case, tlie plain-
tiffs as grantees stood. in the shoes of the grantors 
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and assignors of the lease, and 'vhat the latter 
"-ere required or obligated to do, so likewise were 
the plaintiffs. Such is the general rule and as 
shown in 
35 C. J., Sec. 544, page 1214. 
As there stated, 'Yhere the lessee is in possession, 
the purchaser takes subject to the lease, and where 
the lessee is in possession under a defective or void 
lr·.q.~e, the purchaser will take subject to any equities 
of the lessee, that generally the rights and liabilities 
existing between the grantee and the lessee a.re 
the same as those existing between the ,grantor and 
the lessee. Many cases are cited in support of the 
text. On the following page it is also stated tha,t 
if a lease is voidable, the grantee may, oy his; acts, 
preclude himself from thereafter attaeking it, as 
by the acceptance of rent; and if the lease is void-
able at its inception and the lessee has. paid rents 
and. made improvements, a subsequent purchas(?r 
of the land with knowledge of the facts cannot -avoid 
the lease'. 
... \_s shown by the record and on the facts as 
found by the court, the plaintiffs- had no more right, 
than had their grantors if no conveyance of tlie 
r>remises had been made, to terminate the tenancy 
of the defendant by the service of notice demand-
jng possession of the premises and upon a refusal 
tG surrender possession, to bring an action therefor. 
There can he no greater invasion of rights' with re-
~pect to leas.ed premises than by a wrongful service 
of notice to vacate and the bringing of . an action 
to eject the tenant from the premis.es. To defend 
his occupation and enjoyment, one in possession 
of necessity is required to employ counsel andls 
put to costs and expenses 1n defending and main-
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ta.ining his rights under specified and agTeed cov-
enants of his lease. 
Here the covenant in the leas.e whereby either 
party was to pay costs, attorney's fees and expens-es 
incurred arising from enforcing the covenants of 
the le~a.se, was mutual and reciprocal and was for 
the benefit not only of the lessor, but also of the 
lessee. That is, it "\vas not only a personal cov-
enant, so far as the lessor was concerned, hut it was, 
as well, a mutual and reciprocal covenant for the 
benefit of the lessee. 
The plaintiffs here having served a notice that 
the defendant vacate the p·remis,es and upon its re-
fusal to do so having brought this action, the de-
fendant, by setting- up. its lease and the provisions 
therein contained, pleaded and invoked an enforce-
ment of the terms. of the lease, including the cov-
enant relating to attorney's fees. 
We note the eases cited by appellants upon this 
subject. They cite Hollander v. Central J\tfetal, etc. 
,Co., (Md.); 71 Atl. 442; 2'3 L.R.A. (N. S.). 1135. 
It will he observed that the Court there was, con-
sidering the question of whether a covenant by the· 
lessor to convey in fee to the lessee, its heirs, .and 
assigns upon the p·erformanee of certain conditions. 
runs with the land. The Court held it did. We 
have no disagreement as lo what the Court there 
said as to covenants running with the land. And 
further, let it be noticed that the cited case went off 
on a demurrer to the complaint. 
They also cite Cohen v. Birns, 170 N.Y. S. 
560. A reading of the case will show that it has 
here no application. There, Cohen and liis co-
tenants deposited with ·Weiss, the lessor, $400.00 
as security for tbe performance by the tenants of 
the covenants of the lease, one of 'vhich was the 
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pa:y1nent of the rent when due, the repair of the 
premises and their surrender in as good condition 
as reasonable 'Year and tear permitted, and that 
-the deposit of $400.00 'vas to be returned to Cohen 
and his co-tenants at the expiration of the lease if 
the covenants were kept and performed. Space 
does not permit here a reYiew of the case. A read-
ing of it "ill shovr that it has no application, for, 
it is not even clear whether the dep.osit of ·$400.00 
''as a part of the lease or not, or something entirely 
collateral to the lease. Here the covenant to pay 
attorney's fees was not collateral. It wa.s a part of 
the lease itself. 
The case of ~lagoon v. Eastman, 84 Atl. 869, 
also is cited. There the lease contained a provision 
that the lessee, "\vhen he vacated the premises, was 
required to leave as much ha.y on the farm a8 was 
there when he took possession and where the de-
fendant left the required amount of hay, but it was 
not cut in proper season and by reason thereof~ was 
of less value than it otherwise would have beenr and 
by reason of which, it was ''claimed that the 
plaintiff, as successor in interest to the lessor, was. 
entitled to the required amount of hay p-roperly and 
~easona.bly harvested according to the rules of good 
husbandry.'' With resp·ect to that the Court said 
that might he so, but that the question there was 
'vhether he could recover damages in an action of 
covenant brought in his own name and where from 
further observations it was made to appear that 
the court merely denied the action becaus-e of its 
form, that is, that it "\Vas not "an action of cov-
f nant, '' but one for damages. 
The appellants also cite Brandley v. Lewis, 
(Utah); 92 Pac. (2d) 338. We submit the case is in-
applicable, for all that was there considered and 
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decided was that the appeal was not taken within 
time, and therefore it was dismissed. 
Forrester v. Cook, (Utah), 292 Pac. 206, also 
is cited. The contract there provided for an attor-
ney's fees, but the court s.aid that "this is not an 
a.ction to enforce the agreement,'' that the plain-
tjff proceeded upon the theory that the agreement 
fixed the status of the parties with forfeiture, that 
thereupon the defendants became t~nants at will, 
and that "no attempt was made to enforce any of 
the provisions of the contract,'' and hence the law, 
·and not the contract, fixed the measure of the dam-
ages and that the law itself did not allow attorney's 
fees in that sort o£ an action, and for that reason 
attorney's fees were not allowed. The question 
there was not one dealing with the question of 
whether the covenant was one running with the land 
or not. 
Leone v. Zuniga, (Utah), 34 P·ac. (2d) 699, alRo 
is cited. Neither does this cas,e involve any ques-
tion as to whether a covenant was one running with 
the land or not. We see no application of the cita-
tion of these ·utah cases.. Excerpts of other cases 
ion the subject are also cited by the app~ellants. To 
see their application they must be consjdered in 
connection with the facts of such cases and the par-
tieular questions before the Court for decision. 
vVhen so considered we think them not analogous 
to either the facts or the question here involved. 
According to ·the authorities and cases, it is 
sometimes rather difficult in ascertaining wheth~r 
the particular covenant is one running with the land 
~or not. Texts and authorities teach that whether 
the covenant is one running "\vith the land or not 
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is to be determined from the intention of the parties 
and as gathered from the 'vhole instrument. In 
the case of 
Keogh v. Peck, 316 TIL 318; 147 N.E. 266; 
38 A.L.R. 1151, 
the Court said that the test as to whether the cov-
enant runs with the land or is merely 'personal, is 
"\\~hether the covenant concerns the thing granted 
and the occupation or enjoyment of it, or is a mere 
collateral and personal covenant not immediately 
concerning the thing granted. In 
7 R. C. L., page 1106, Sec. 22, 
the author says that as a general rule covenants 
in a lease relating to the thing demised run with the 
land even though the covenant does not in certain 
instances have reference to something to be done 
upon the land itself; that in accordance with the 
general rule real covenants running with the lana 
in leases jnclude covenants to pay rent, taxes or 
assessments, to insure, to make improvements or 
to pay for improvements, to make rep,airs or to 
share in such expense, to deliver up the demised 
premises in good order and repair, to renew a lease, 
restrict the lessee 7s right of alienation, and other 
conditions there enumerated. See also the follow-
ing sections or paragraphs ; and also 
Notes, 41 A.L.R. 1370, 
where annotations are enumerated as to what cov-
enants are considered as running with the land. 
The claus.e or covenant here in question was 
not something wholly collateral and independent of 
the lease itself. It was something which expressly 
and directly rela.ted to the enjoyment and occupa-
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tion of the leas,ed premises and to the enforcement 
of the mutual and reciprocal rights and ben-
·efi ts of the lessors and the lessee. In other wordB, 
and as heretofore observed7 the act of the plaintiffs, 
.1.Jhe grantees, without right serving a notice upon 
the defendant to surrender up the possession of the 
premises and upon its refusal so to do.
1 
the bringing 
I 
of an action to dispossess the defendant and to eject 
it from the p·remises was a direct invasion of the 
defendant's rights to the use and enjoyment of the 
p·roperty, and that the clause. or covenant in the 
Jease had a direct hearing up.on such invasion and 
as bearing on the enforcement of the covenants of 
the lea.se on behalf of the les.see. W a thus. say that 
such a covenant is one running with the land just 
as much as a covenant to p·ay rent. But if it may 
not be so considered, we further contend that under 
the facts, as 'found and conclusions stated by the 
court, and particularly because of the actual knowl-
edge of the plaintiffs before they purchased the 
prop~erty of the terms and conditions of the lease, 
rincluding the clause or covenant in question, ana 
of the valuable and p.ermanent improvements made 
'hy the defendant, and of part p·erformance upon 
its part, and of the facts as found by the court of 
the estoppel of the p·laintiffs from questioning the 
:validity or binding effect of the lease, and of the 
plaintiffs' accep·tance of parts of the lease and 
attemp1ting to reject other p.arts, the plaintiffs are 
bound by the clause or covenant in question to the 
same extent a.s though it wa.s a covenant running 
with the land, and that the court may no more in 
the one case than in the other treat and regard the 
·covenant in question as co1lateral to or independent 
of the lease, but is required to consideT the cov· 
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enant as part and parcel thereof and as a binding 
obligjation not only as to the lessors, but also upon 
their g;rantees 'Yho purchased the premises w1th 
full kno,vledge of all the rights, privileges and 
equities of the defendant in possession. 
We thus respectfully submit that the judgment 
of the court be affirmed, with costs to the re-
spondents. 
WILLARD HANSON, 
STEW ART M. HANSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and RespQndent. 
D. N. STRAUP, of Counsel. 
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